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Abstract      
 
This thesis has three following theoretical objectives. The first objective is to introduce the costs and 
benefits of a monetary union. The second objective is to introduce the concept of asymmetric shocks. 
The third objective is to introduce optimum currency areas (OCA) theory and its development from the 
1960s. The theoretical framework is elaborated and supported by literature from notable economists 
and researchers. 
 
This thesis has two following objectives on Finland and its EMU-membership. Firstly to introduce 
Finland’s official economic report about the costs and benefits of the EMU ex ante and secondly to 
introduce 2010s Finnish economists’ reviews on Finland’s EMU-membership. 
 
The empirical objectives of this thesis are to find out potential asymmetries in GDP trend deviations 
among the eleven original EMU-countries and Greece. For the second empirical objective, this thesis 
examines whether economic integration, in terms of GDP trend deviations, has increased in the above-
mentioned countries during the common currency and lastly to find out how GDP trend deviations affect 
the unemployment rate in these countries, using a simple regression model. 
 
According to the empirical results of this thesis, economic integration among the original EMU-
countries has increased during the common currency. Hence, the member states have faced less 
asymmetric GDP shocks in the euro-period than before it. The finding supports the economic argument 
of the Eurozone. Germany is an interesting exception, as its GDP trend deviations are explicitly weakly 
correlated to the other member states. In addition, Germany and Greece together have the only negative 
GDP trend deviation correlation of all the EMU-countries. The results also depict that the economic 
integration of Finland has increased during the time of the common currency. 
 
Economic stability, with respect to the size of GDP trend deviations, has not increased during the 
common currency. The results show that there are remarkable differences in how sensitively the labor 
markets in different countries react to the out of trend GDP shocks. Also, the member states have large 
differences in GDP growth rates, which can in the long run stress economic cohesion, thus widen the 
gap of living standards. 
 
The empirical results discovered here can be widely used for further examination. Especially deeper 
country-specific investigation could provide reasoning for various smaller observations, for example, 
the close relation of Finland and Spain. Also, the results can be used as a comparison for similar 
research. 
Keywords      
Optimum currency areas, EMU, monetary union, common currency 
Additional information     
 
  
 
CONTENTS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... 6 
1.1 Structure ..................................................................................................... 6 
1.2 Motivation ................................................................................................... 7 
1.3 Monetary integration ................................................................................. 8 
2 THEORY OF MONETARY UNION COSTS ............................................... 10 
2.1 Shock dynamics ........................................................................................ 10 
2.2 Debt dynamics .......................................................................................... 13 
3 THEORY OF MONETARY UNION BENEFITS ......................................... 16 
3.1 Transaction costs ...................................................................................... 17 
3.2 Price transparency ................................................................................... 17 
3.3 Uncertainty ............................................................................................... 18 
3.4 Currency substitution .............................................................................. 20 
4 THEORY OF OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS ......................................... 23 
4.1 Traditional approach ............................................................................... 23 
4.1.1 Mundell ........................................................................................... 24 
4.1.2 McKinnon ....................................................................................... 25 
4.1.3 Kenen .............................................................................................. 26 
4.1.4 Criticism .......................................................................................... 27 
4.1.5 Summary of different perspectives ................................................. 34 
4.2 Modern views ............................................................................................ 35 
5 FINLAND IN THE EMU ................................................................................. 44 
5.1 Background ............................................................................................... 45 
5.2 Jukka Pekkarinen EMU-report .............................................................. 47 
5.2.1 Path to the euro ............................................................................... 50 
5.2.2 Utility of the monetary union .......................................................... 53 
 
5.2.3 Finnish economy and asymmetric shocks ....................................... 55 
5.2.4 Monetary policy in the Eurozone .................................................... 57 
5.2.5 Fiscal policy .................................................................................... 58 
5.2.6 About regions and taxation ............................................................. 59 
5.2.7 Labor markets and unemployment.................................................. 60 
5.3 2010s Finnish views .................................................................................. 62 
6 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ................................................................................ 68 
6.1 Shock analysis ........................................................................................... 72 
6.1.1 1999–2019....................................................................................... 72 
6.1.2 1970–1998....................................................................................... 79 
6.2 Unemployment and shocks ...................................................................... 82 
7 SUMMARY ....................................................................................................... 88 
7.1 Key findings .............................................................................................. 89 
7.2 Further research ....................................................................................... 91 
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 92 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 ....................................................................................................... 102 
Appendix 2 ....................................................................................................... 103 
 
 
 
 
  
 
FIGURES 
Figure 1. Business cycle symmetry, trade integration and the monetary regime (adapted from 
Frankel & Rose, 1998). ............................................................................................................... 42 
Figure 2. Normalized logarithmic real GDP in certain Euro countries between 1999Q1–
2019Q3, 1999Q1=100 (FRED, 2020). ......................................................................................... 69 
Figure 3. Normalized logarithmic real GDP in Finland and EU11 between 1999Q1–2019Q2 
(FRED, 2020). .............................................................................................................................. 71 
Figure 4. Correlation with EU11 countries in the two periods. .............................................. 81 
Figure 5. Seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in certain EMU-countries between 
1999Q1–2019Q4 (Eurostat, 2020). ............................................................................................. 83 
 
TABLES 
Table 1. Statistical measures of normalized logarithmic real GDP trend deviations between 
1999Q1–2019Q2. ......................................................................................................................... 72 
Table 2. Correlation matrix of trend deviations of logarithmic real GDP between 1999Q1–
2019Q2. ........................................................................................................................................ 77 
Table 3. Correlation matrix of trend deviations of logarithmic real GDP between 1970–1998.
 ...................................................................................................................................................... 78 
Table 4. Statistical measures of normalized logarithmic real GDP trend deviations between 
1970–1998. .................................................................................................................................... 79 
Table 5. Unemployment and employment correlations between 1999Q1–2019Q3/Q4. ........ 84 
Table 6. Results of the regression analysis. ............................................................................... 86 
 
6 
1 INTRODUCTION 
On the 1st of January 1999 Finland and 10 other European Union (EU) member states 
established the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU, Eurozone) and adopted the euro 
as their common currency and sole legal tender. On the 1st of January 2002, physical 
euro notes and coins were introduced to ultimately replace national currencies. 
Subsequently, the Eurozone monetary union has expanded and currently 19 of the 27 
European Union member states are part of it. The euro is the most traded currency by 
value after the US dollar and over 340 million people use it on a daily basis. The 
Eurozone member states have relinquished their national monetary policy to the 
European Central Bank (ECB). It can be seen as a political issue when a country gives 
up a part of its autonomy, but also as an economic issue because national monetary 
policy provides strong instruments for maintaining national price stability. The ECB 
aspires to practice monetary policy that is beneficial for the Eurozone as a whole. 
Therefore, it does not take a single member state’s needs into account, which might be 
problematic if a single country’s economy largely differs from other EMU members’ 
economies. Eventually, economic divergence might lead to a situation in which the 
monetary policy of the ECB is ineffective or even adverse for deviant countries or 
regions. The study of this issue has a central role in this thesis and is a basis for the 
optimum currency area(s) theory (OCA). 
1.1 Structure 
The thesis is divided into three main parts. Firstly the theoretical framework of the 
subject including costs and benefits of a monetary union and the development of the 
OCA-theory is introduced. This section addresses the question of why a country or 
countries are willing to establish or join a monetary union, in this case especially the 
Eurozone. The costs and benefits of a monetary union are explained with brief and 
easily understandable paradigms based on economic textbooks of Paul De Grauwe 
(2018) and a duo of Richard Baldwin and Charles Wyplosz (2015). These authors’ 
contribution to the study of international economics is remarkable. The OCA-theory 
part starts with Nobel laureate Robert Mundell’s (1961) pioneering paper about 
optimum currency areas and later covers the development and criticism of the topic. 
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The second part focuses on an analysis of the EMU-membership of Finland but does 
not attempt to clearly state whether there are more benefits or costs from the common 
currency. The report of the Finnish EMU-Committee from 1997 has a major role in 
this section because it provides the most comprehensive groundwork for economic 
reasoning for Finland’s membership. It covers the concrete costs and benefits the EMU 
could potentially bring to the Finnish economy. The section also includes 2010s 
reviews from acquainted Finnish economists Jukka Pekkarinen (2018), Pentti 
Pikkarainen (2014), Jaakko Kiander (2019), Ilkka Kiema (2017) and Vesa Vihriälä 
(2017). 
The third and final part of the thesis is an empirical analysis composed by the author. 
The analysis is faithful to the concept of asymmetric shocks of the OCA-theory. In 
practice, euro-period GDP trend shocks of the first eleven EMU member states are 
compared among each other in order to find potential asymmetries, which in theory, 
weaken the function of common monetary policy. Lastly, it is analyzed how sensitive 
the country-specific unemployment rates are to the shocks. The ideal outcome of the 
analysis is to obtain support either for the monetary union membership or national 
currency. Since the analysis is not sufficiently encompassing, the author will not 
present unambiguous propositions for or against the monetary union. 
1.2 Motivation 
The topic has been a subject of interest probably as long as the study of international 
economics has existed however the particular optimum currency areas theory has 
attracted research from the 1960s on. The theory has been considered both in 
macroeconomics school books and papers of Nobel prize winners and by other 
influential researchers. In addition, there are enormous real-life examples in which the 
theories can be applied for instance The United States and especially the Eurozone. 
Indeed, the latter could be seen as an experimental manifestation of the optimum 
currency areas theory. 
The topic is interesting as such as it deals with everyday small operations such as 
shopping online with a foreign currency but it also considers large macroeconomic 
affairs for example inflation, unemployment, and monetary and fiscal policies. Upon 
8 
joining a monetary union, every single individual of the country is somehow affected 
by the effects, which are dealt with in this thesis likewise in numerous other scientific 
papers and textbooks related to the issue. 
Finland’s current and past position, as well as the path to the EMU, are interesting, 
mostly because the author happens to be Finnish, but also for more thematical reasons. 
Firstly, Finland was among the early member states of the EMU, and no country had 
ever experienced such a significant change, in which several different nations adopt a 
common currency. Secondly, Finland is still the only country, that brings Nordic 
economic and cultural perspective to the monetary union, as the other Scandinavian 
countries never joined the EMU. Furthermore, Finland is geographically and perhaps 
economically distant from the core of the monetary union in which economic 
integration has occurred for long and the important common decisions are made. The 
Eurozone has faced two large economic crises during its relatively short existence. 
First the global financial crisis of 2008 and subsequently the alleged Euro crisis, which 
both have stressed the common currency. It is interesting to ponder if Finland’s 
national currency could have been a better option during the hard times and in general. 
1.3 Monetary integration 
The core idea of the OCA-theory is not too complicated. Nowadays the costs and 
benefits of forming a monetary union are well known and there is a strong scientific 
consensus regarding the advantages and disadvantages upon a country joining the 
union. The question is how well the costs and benefits can be compared and whether 
the decision to join the union is worthwhile or not. 
To understand what a monetary union is, knowledge about monetary integration is 
required. Tavlas (1993) proposes that monetary integration between countries has 
various degrees and they are defined in the following paragraphs. The definitions are 
based on the works of Corden (1972), Robson (1987 and later 1998) and Gandolfo 
(1992). The reason for the different degrees of monetary integration stems from the 
well-known trilemma and the preferred objectives of monetary authorities and 
governments (Cohen, 1992). The trilemma stands for the impossibility to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate, free capital flows and monetary autonomy simultaneously. The 
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theoretical argument for the trilemma is based on the Mundell-Fleming model 
(Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1963). 
1) Exchange rate unions. Exchange rates between the member states are fixed and 
fluctuations from the benchmark are not permitted. Monetary policies of the member 
states are not necessarily coordinated, but in order to comply with the trilemma, 
interregional capital flows must be restricted somehow. 
2) Pseudo exchange rate unions. The term is brought forth by Corden (1972). It 
indicates fixed exchange rates and free capital mobility between the member states of 
the union, but without formal monetary policy integration. As a result, the fixed 
exchange rate peg is likely to loosen at some point due to speculative capital flows. 
3) Monetary integration. This arrangement involves exchange rate unification, which 
means permanently fixed exchange rates and the absence of rate fluctuations. 
Monetary integration also includes free capital flows, the absence of currency 
conversion controls, financial integration and a common unionwide monetary policy. 
(Robson 1987, 1998, pp. 190–193.)  
4) Monetary unification. This arrangement is monetary integration and in addition a 
single common currency and a unionwide central bank. The member states relinquish 
their national monetary policy to the central bank of the union. The central monetary 
authority controls foreign currency reserves (Robson, 1987, 1998, pp. 190). Moreover, 
monetary unification also entails responsibility for exchange rate policy with other 
currencies with the rest of the world. 
In this thesis, monetary unification or in other words monetary union has the main 
focus of the mentioned degrees of monetary integration. Fixing exchange rates is 
assumed to indicate a monetary union with a single central bank and currency. The 
reason is that the other, lighter degrees of monetary union have a risk of currency peg 
break, that will likely shatter the monetary integration between countries. Secondly, 
the Eurozone is a full monetary union and represents a modern conception of monetary 
integration in the world of floating exchange rates. 
10 
2 THEORY OF MONETARY UNION COSTS 
The fundamental cost of establishing or joining a monetary union is a loss of the 
national monetary policy. Frankel and Rose (1996) write that the advantages of a 
flexible exchange rate can be summarized into one major aspect, the independent 
monetary policy, which will be relinquished upon joining a monetary union. A national 
central bank, for example the Bank of Finland, may still exist yet it has no real power. 
It is rather a public authority under the indirect control of the ECB, and an economic 
research institute. As Mundell has stated, “A single currency implies a single central 
bank” (Mundell, 1961, pp. 658). In a monetary union, a national central bank cannot 
regulate the currency stock in the economy or change the short-term interest rate. Both 
of these actions affect a national price level, of which stabilization is usually 
considered the most important objective of the central bank, for instance, the ECB. 
Also, adjusting the national price level is a strong weapon against international demand 
shocks. The loss of national monetary policy can be considered as a political issue as 
well. People may think it is principally detrimental to give up national monetary 
autonomy, although the monetary union offers other benefits. 
2.1 Shock dynamics 
The concept of asymmetric shocks is introduced in Mundell’s (1961) paper and later 
addressed in various textbooks, for example, De Grauwe (2018) or Baldwin and 
Wyplosz (2015). The loss of national monetary policy and the consequences of this 
can be comprehensibly demonstrated by simple examples of demand shifts on the 
market. Suppose that two countries for instance Finland and Sweden use a common 
currency, ergo have a monetary union. The countries experience an asymmetric shock 
whereat the aggregate demand shifts from Finland to Sweden. As a result, the output 
and price level declines in Finland and consequently increases in Sweden. On the other 
hand, unemployment rises in the former and decreases in the latter. Neither of the 
countries is in an optimal position. Finland faces a recession and Sweden an 
inflationary boom. This very situation is an asymmetric shock as it has different 
consequences in different regions. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2015, pp. 356–363; De 
Grauwe, 2018, pp. 4–14.) 
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There are two mechanisms that will automatically bring equilibrium back in the two 
countries. One is wage flexibility and the other is mobility of labor. Wage flexibility 
indicates that the unemployed workers in Finland are ready to request less wage, 
whereas the excess demand for labor will raise the wage level in Sweden. Due to 
changes in the labor costs, aggregate supply will increase in Finland and decline in 
Sweden. As a result, a new equilibrium occurs in which the price level of Finland is 
lower than initially, making the country internationally more competitive. The 
opposite takes place in Sweden. The risen difference in the wage level between the 
countries might alter the new equilibrium all the more. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2015, 
pp. 356–370; De Grauwe, 2018, pp. 4–8.) 
If wage flexibility is insufficient, the mobility of labor will possibly lead to a new 
equilibrium123. As the name suggests, the mobility of labor means that the unemployed 
workers of Finland will move to Sweden as a result of excess demand for labor. The 
Finnish unemployment problem disappears, whereas the inflation problem fades in 
Sweden. The disequilibrium issue will not vanish if these mentioned mechanisms do 
not occur. Unemployment remains in Finland and inflation in Sweden. The real-world 
reasons that prevent the mechanisms from happening are for example language or 
culture barriers in the new country or bargaining power of labor unions. (Baldwin & 
Wyplosz, 2015, pp. 356–370; De Grauwe, 2018, pp. 4–8.) 
Assuming the countries would have kept their national currency and were not in a 
monetary union, hence national monetary policy instruments to fight against 
unemployment and inflation could be utilized. The before mentioned being an 
adjustment of the domestic interest rate and de/revaluation of the currency. The former 
is effective in floating exchange rate regimes, for example, the dollar and pound 
sterling. Furthermore, the national central bank lowers the interest rate, which 
 
1 Blanchard and Katz (1992) show evidence that labor mobility plays a major role in the adjustment 
process to economic shocks between US states. However they acknowledge that labor mobility will 
likely remain lower in Europe. 
2 Eichengreen (1993) suggests with empirical data that domestic labor markets are considerably more 
responsive to regional disequilibria in the US than in the UK or Italy, supporting the proposition of 
Blanchard and Katz. 
3 Beyer and Smets (2015) propose that adjustment process to shocks is somewhat similar in Europe and 
the US but it takes longer and is not as responsive as in the former. 
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stimulates the domestic aggregate demand. This depreciation would reduce 
unemployment in Finland and lead back to the initial equilibrium. If Sweden were to 
raise its interest rate, aggregate demand would decline and dampen inflation. Again, 
appreciation of the domestic currency would take Sweden to the initial equilibrium.  
The other method of de/revaluing works within currency peg regimes id est fixed 
exchange rate. Assuming that the mentioned countries have a currency peg, Finland 
suffers from unemployment and Sweden from inflation. In this case, Finland is willing 
to devalue its currency against the Swedish kronor, and therefore stimulate the 
aggregate demand from the latter to the former. The opposite takes place in Sweden. 
It wants to practice restrictive monetary policy, reducing the aggregate demand. 
Summarily, if wage flexibility is rigid and the level of labor mobility is low, countries 
in a monetary union have it harder to react to asymmetric shocks in comparison to 
countries that can utilize national monetary policy. As mentioned earlier, the 
adjustment of interest rate and de/revaluing are strong tools against shocks. Based on 
the given information here, Finland and Sweden should be skeptical about forming a 
monetary union from an economic point of view. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2015, pp. 356–
360; De Grauwe, 2018, pp. 4–8.) 
Baldwin and Wyplosz give a hypothetical example from the United States. Now the 
issue lies within the borders and not between two countries. Michigan was a home of 
the American car industry. Chrysler, Ford and General Motors attracted workers from 
all over the United States for secure and well-paid jobs. Afterward, the US motor 
industry took a hit and the demand declined. This hurt especially Michigan as Chrysler 
was sold to Fiat and both General Motors and the city of Detroit went bankrupt4. If the 
state would have had an own currency instead of the dollar, it could have depreciated 
the exchange rate, and therefore the cars made in Michigan would have been cheaper 
for the rest of the United States and abroad. American cars would have been more 
competitive against European or Japanese cars. The example is just demonstrative 
because no one really promoted abandoning the dollar in Michigan. The reason might 
 
4 See Klier (2009) for an overview of the Detroit automotive industry decline. 
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be that the dollar brings more benefits in general and it is assumed that one country 
means one currency. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2015, pp. 350.) 
2.2 Debt dynamics 
The loss of national monetary independence is not just a hit to the country’s ability to 
deal with asymmetric shocks but also hinders the capacity to finance government 
budget deficits. Member states of a monetary union issue debt in a currency which 
they cannot individually control because monetary policy is relinquished to the central 
bank of the union. For example, Finland had full control over the national currency 
markka and also devalued it on demand prior to joining the EMU. The problem with 
nationally uncontrollable currency and debts is that financial markets obtain a 
theoretical possibility to force monetary union member states to default. This does not 
occur in countries that have kept the own national currency and are not part of a 
monetary union. Nevertheless, these countries might still undergo a default, but it is 
not easily forced by financial markets. The most straightforward way to explain the 
concept is to use the following examples. 
Supposing Finland is not a member of a monetary union, it can practice national 
monetary policy and have control over own currency. The investors fear that the 
Finnish government is likely defaulting its debt. Consequently, they sell their Finnish 
government bonds, which shoots up the interest rate. In fear of the default, the 
investors want to get rid of the money they received from selling the bonds. The trade 
takes place through the foreign exchange rate market that will be flooded with the 
Finnish markka. The price of the currency drops until someone else is willing to buy 
it. Since Finland is a stand-alone nation and not part of a monetary union, its currency 
is worthless outside its borders. This means that the money remains in the country’s 
asset market and does not escape abroad. In financial terms, the Finnish money stock 
is unchanged. If the investors are afraid to re-invest in government securities at a 
reasonable interest rate, the government can always force the national central bank to 
provide liquidity to finance the debt or pay out the bondholders. Hence, financial 
markets cannot drive Finland into default, because as a lender of the last resort the 
national central bank is capable of providing liquidity indefinitely. Printing money 
leads to inflation, but it does not change the fact that a country with own currency can 
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not be forced into default, and speculators are aware of this. (De Grauwe, 2018, pp. 8–
12.) 
Now in turn Sweden is a member of monetary union and has a common currency as a 
legal tender for instance the euro. Supposedly again the investors fear the country 
defaulting its debt, they sell their government bonds as a result. The interest rate rises, 
but now it does not affect foreign exchange rates as the investors are most likely not 
willing to trade the common currency for another. To evade transaction costs, the 
investors probably put their money in another country of the monetary union, so there 
is no need for currency exchange. Even if the money exchange was the case, it would 
hardly affect the exchange rate, provided that the rest of the monetary union is doing 
well. An assumption is that Sweden is relatively small compared to the entire monetary 
union for example the Eurozone. When the investors collect their money from Sweden 
and invest them in another country of the monetary union, the Swedish money stock 
shrinks as an outcome. As mentioned above, the exchange rate does not rise and puts 
a brake on the currency leak from the country. In addition, the national central bank 
cannot be forced to provide liquidity for financing the government debt or pay out the 
bondholders, because national monetary policy instruments are given up to the central 
bank of the monetary union. Theoretically, any monetary union member state can be 
forced into default, as the money stock is finite, but essentially the threat is toward 
highly indebted countries. On paper, a government liquidity issue can rather easily turn 
into a solvency crisis even without a speculative attack. Investors sell their bonds and 
the government has to increase the interest rate, which in turn leads to a higher debt 
burden. This would force the government to cut spending and raise taxes. Budgetary 
austerity is politically costly and at worst causes insolvency and a default. (De Grauwe, 
2018, pp. 8–12.) 
Asymmetric shocks combined with dubious debt mechanisms in a monetary union 
may lead to twofold harm. Suppose again that Finland and Sweden are in a monetary 
union together. The countries experience an asymmetric shock, reducing aggregate 
demand in Finland (recession), and increasing aggregate demand (boom) in Sweden. 
The weakened GDP in Finland results in higher unemployment transfer payments and 
lower progressive tax revenues id est the Finnish government budget deficit increases. 
If the deficit is sufficiently large, the threat introduced in the previous paragraph may 
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arise. Investors will become skeptical about Finland’s solvency and sell the 
government bonds to save their money. The interest rate rises and the aggregate 
demand falls even further because the domestic consumption and investments decline. 
(De Grauwe, 2018, pp. 10–14.) 
To state briefly, the debt crisis amplifies the initial negative demand shock in Finland 
and the opposite happens in Sweden. The investors probably re-invest the money they 
received from the Finnish government bonds to Sweden, where the interest rate 
consequently falls. This liquidity flow boosts the Swedish economy and the aggregate 
demand climbs even further than what it initially was. The positive demand shock in 
Sweden is amplified by the currency leak in Finland. In this case, the investors did not 
trust the Finnish government and it emerged as a destabilization in the monetary union. 
On the condition that investors do trust the government’s financial standing, the effect 
dampens the liquidity flow from Finland to Sweden and it does not occur. The interest 
rate in Finland remains unchanged or at least moderate and the government easily 
acquires government bonds to alleviate the initial negative demand shock. Since the 
government of Sweden does not receive the investors’ money from Finland, the 
interest rate also lasts unchanged and the amplifying effect does not take place in 
Sweden. All in all, the capital markets are in a role that decides between stabilization 
and destabilization in a monetary union. It is up to investors’ view of how reliable they 
see governments in recession. The interest rate difference between the countries can 
be explained by the long-term government bond rates. Even if the central bank of the 
monetary union determines the short-term interest rate, the governments still have to 
pay a market-based interest rate for bonds. The price of funding is dependent on how 
risky the investors see the governments. (De Grauwe, 2018, pp. 10–14.) 
16 
3 THEORY OF MONETARY UNION BENEFITS 
Being a member of a monetary union has relatively heavy costs, reducing monetary 
independence of a state. Expectedly monetary union has to offer benefits to make 
joining in rational. The academic consensus regarding the benefits of monetary union 
is rather coherent. According to De Grauwe (2018, pp. 55), monetary union costs are 
mainly macroeconomic while benefits are at a microeconomic level. The benefits are 
based on two essential features. The first is to get rid of transaction costs related to the 
exchange of national currencies. The second is the elimination of risk originated from 
uncertain exchange rate fluctuations. 
Frankel and Rose (1996) are somewhat on the same line with De Grauwe. They say 
that two great advantages of fixing the exchange rate are; to reduce transaction costs 
and exchange risk, which can discourage trade and investment, and to provide a 
credible nominal anchor for monetary policy.  
Correspondingly, Tomann (2017, pp. 23) lists currency union benefits as a) 
Transaction costs are reduced, b) Indirect effects: more transparent markets, c) Price 
discrimination is reduced, d) Monetary investment risks are diminished, e) Growth 
effects.  
The European Commission (1990) evaluates in its One market, one money - report 
that the main benefits of the euro are 1) Exit exchange rate transaction costs, 2) Exit 
exchange rate uncertainty costs, 3) Indirect dynamic gains from economic and 
monetary union, 4) Business expectations and growth.  
Corden (1972) mentions the reduction of destabilizing speculations and an increase in 
capital mobility being the two possibly favorable effects of an exchange rate union. 
One can conclude that the understanding of the theoretical benefits of a monetary 
union is fairly consistent. After all, the lists of benefits from the economists and 
institutions essentially aim at the same objective, general balance in the economy in 
terms of unemployment and price stability. 
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3.1 Transaction costs 
De Grauwe, Baldwin and Wyplosz approach the absence of transaction costs 
pragmatically. The former proposes that about 5% of bank revenues are commissions 
paid to banks in the exchange of national currencies. In a monetary union, this revenue 
naturally disappears. De Grauwe says that transaction costs related to exchanging 
money are a deadweight loss for consumers who have to pay but get nothing in return. 
He continues that in monetary union banks have to replace the revenue loss of 
transaction costs, meaning they must focus on other profitable activities, which will be 
utility for society. Baldwin and Wyplosz point out that without a common currency, 
exporters and importers have to negotiate which currency would be used. Both parties 
prefer their own currencies, but in the end someone has to bear the transaction costs. 
First they might seem trivial, but after all they are deadweight loss, which takes 
resources from the core activity. (De Grauwe, 2018, pp. 55–56; Baldwin & Wyplosz, 
2015, pp. 352.) 
3.2 Price transparency 
Upon a common currency, prices of goods become directly comparable between the 
countries in a monetary union. This will increase competition especially with lower 
transaction costs. For consumers it is easier to buy goods outside of their own country. 
The increased competition is expected to be a benefit for the consumers as prices 
decline and producers are more encouraged to innovate their products. Price 
transparency also restrains inflationary wage-setting process because devaluations or 
exchange rate depreciations are no longer available with the common currency. If the 
exchange rate is adjustable, wages and prices tend to rise particularly in export sectors 
thus reflecting to the entire economy. Eventually, this inflationary process will harm 
the country’s competitiveness and the exchange rate is used to reset the economically 
and socially adverse vicious circle. The depreciation helps export sectors and increases 
competitiveness, but at the same time prices of imports rise as well, meaning that the 
method is not so efficient altogether. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, wage-setting 
must be moderate and controlled as the absence of depreciation leads to wage cuts, 
layoffs and longer working hours in order to keep or increase a country’s 
competitiveness. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2015, pp. 353.) 
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De Grauwe agrees with Baldwin and Wyplosz on the theory yet states that there is a 
lot of evidence that price discrimination is still widely practiced in Europe. He refers 
to Eurostat statistics and proposes that in 2011 in Finland an average basket of goods 
was 22% more expensive than in the Eurozone, while the cheapest basket was found 
in Slovakia having it 30% cheaper than the Eurozone average. This means over 50% 
price difference between the cheapest and the most expensive ones.  It is worth noting 
that the compared items were supermarket products, which allows price 
differentiation, as people tend not to buy groceries from abroad. De Grauwe writes that 
the price differentials still remain high for more expensive products such as cameras, 
cellphones, and cars. The euro might have improved price comparison, but it is 
doubtful that it has done much to eliminate the price differentials, he adds. (De 
Grauwe, 2018, pp. 56–59.) 
3.3 Uncertainty 
Exchange rate fluctuations are very difficult or impossible to predict, meaning they 
contain a risk related to future uncertainty. If exports are priced in the currency of the 
exporter, the importer bears an exchange rate risk, as it does not precisely know what 
the exchange rate will be in the future when it is time to settle the purchase. Countries 
in a monetary union do not have to experience this risk in trade between the other 
member states, because they use a common currency. Eliminating the exchange rate 
uncertainty leads to a less risky business environment and companies can focus more 
on their core activities. This applies to foreign direct investments as well. Apart from 
macroeconomic use, exchange rate changes are mainly just an unnecessary nuisance. 
(Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2015, pp. 353; De Grauwe, 2018, pp. 59–61.) 
It is worth mentioning that a company may achieve higher average profits under the 
floating exchange rates even if the rate changes are equally balanced and do not favor 
the company. Assuming that the firm’s marginal cost curve is conventionally U-shaped 
and under the fixed exchange regime, prices are fixed as well. As a result, the firm can 
completely predict the future profits, provided that the price equals marginal cost. The 
floating exchange rate regime is a different case. Supposedly the actual prices 
symmetrically float around the fixed price, inducing that the flexible exchange rates 
lead to volatile profits. The nature of upward opening MC-curve indicates, that on 
19 
average, profits are higher under the floating exchange regime than the fixed one. 
Humans tend to be risk-averse and prefer certain lower income over uncertain higher 
income, so after all, one could argue that the elimination of the floating exchange rates 
is beneficial at the microeconomic level. On the other hand, the assumption about 
symmetric exchange rate fluctuation is naive, because they are not normally 
distributed. Movements of the exchange rates do not follow any particular pattern and 
it engenders a possibility for tail risks with low probability but large change. The 
mentioned example suggests that the profits or any outcomes are not equally weighed. 
It could happen that the actual price falls under the MC-curve. This eventually drives 
the company out of business. (De Grauwe, 2018, pp. 59–61.) 
Corden offers a similar view from the traditional era. He writes that the permanent and 
complete fixing of exchange rates within the union will end destabilizing speculative 
capital movements in the short-term. A floating exchange rate is not a problem as such, 
but if it is not frequently adjusted it may lead to a currency risk. The two main adverse 
effects of exchange rate fluctuations are instability in the general price level and the 
utility of money as a store of value is declined, Corden says. A fixed exchange rate 
regime eliminates the mentioned issues as stated above. Corden emphasizes that the 
possible gains of the fixed exchange rate affect through capital movements, that is to 
say the exchange rate fluctuations are insignificant in the absence of capital flows. 
(Corden, 1972.) 
The absence of exchange rate risk will stimulate economic growth, via a mechanism 
of decline in the systemic risk5. Since exchange rates and the risks related to them do 
not exist within monetary union, investors will require a lower interest rate. In theory, 
a monetary union is a less risky environment and the prevailing interest rate declines 
in the same proportion as the risk vanishing along with the exchange rates. The 
mechanism is explained by using the Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model, in 
which the ultimate cause of the long-run economic growth is technological progress. 
The concave production function is tangent to a line of which slope indicates an 
interest rate. The elimination of exchange rates reduces the interest rate and the line 
 
5 See Baldwin (1989). The paper offers a comprehensive theoretical analysis of potential growth effects 
regarding the European market liberalization from 1992 onwards. 
20 
becomes flatter. The new tangent point lies higher on the function curve, which 
indicates that the economy has more output and capital per worker. Consequently, the 
economic growth has increased temporarily but returns to its initial level, which 
depends on technological progress and population growth rate. (De Grauwe, 2018, pp. 
63–64.) 
3.4 Currency substitution 
Currency substitution or informally dollarization is separated from the other monetary 
union benefits because it is essentially advantageous for particular countries only. If a 
country’s monetary authorities are weak and cannot achieve or sustain a desirable 
inflation level, the country may see a monetary union as an option, given that the 
central bank of the union practices strict low-inflation monetary policy. By definition, 
dollarization refers to countries in economic crises that adopt the US dollar as their 
legal tender for example certain Latin American countries. In the case of the euro, 
Kosovo and Montenegro have adopted it as their sole currency, but they have no 
issuing rights, as they are not part of the Eurozone.  
In the context of monetary union benefits, currency substitution is rather considered as 
joining the monetary union instead of just adopting the currency. The elimination of 
national currency may truly fix the country’s inflation problem, but the requirement is 
that the central bank monetary policy is strict, thus the low inflation is valued more 
than unemployment. The Barro-Gordon model (1983) demonstrates that the 
equilibrium unemployment level can be reached with higher or lower inflation 
depending on the credibility of monetary authorities. Also, there is a risk that the 
country’s weak monetary authorities will have power in the central bank of the union 
turning it weak and the initial benefit is gone. 
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Corden (1972) points out a related issue that the countries have different positions on 
the Phillips-curve6. It can be based on the structural factors such as labor productivity 
or it is up to different preferences of the governments or central banks. In any case, the 
differences in inflation-unemployment ratio between the countries lead to a problem 
in a fixed exchange regime, as only one kind of policy can be practiced at a time. If 
the countries are in this respect alike, the issue disappears as it does with asymmetric 
shocks and the cost of a monetary union is reduced. If the optimal monetary union 
policy involves different rates of inflation while the exchange rate is fixed, some 
countries are forced to depart from the initial points on the Phillips-curve. This leads 
to a situation in which concerned countries end up having an unfavorable trade-off 
thus suffer either inflation or unemployment more than they would like to. There is no 
need to go further with this topic in Corden’s analysis, because about a decade after 
him, Barro and Gordon (1983) introduced the above-mentioned model, which states 
that the certain unemployment (NAIRU7) can be achieved with both low and high 
inflation. Hence, the trade-off between unemployment and inflation is not set in stone 
as much as Corden and other contemporary economists implied. The desirable low 
inflation - low unemployment ratio requires dedication from the government and 
monetary authorities. It is crucial that the central bank of a monetary union has 
credibility and is capable of practicing appropriate low-inflation monetary policy, or 
otherwise the union will not succeed. 
According to Corden and De Grauwe, only a full monetary union establishes the 
required credibility for the country that suffers from high inflation. By this, they refer 
to currency peg always offering an incentive to devaluation and temporarily reducing 
unemployment at the expense of inflation, which eventually leads to the situation prior 
to the peg. Generally, the rest of the monetary union does not have to bear any welfare 
loss from a single state’s inflation rescue, provided that the union can still maintain the 
strict monetary policy. On the other hand, a country with high-inflation may reach low 
inflation upon joining a monetary union, but it does not automatically abolish other 
 
6 The Phillips-curve is a theoretical model describing an inverse relationship between unemployment 
and inflation. Short-run empirical research supported the theory until the 1970s stagflation. Modern 
versions of the model are still used for understanding the relationship. 
7 NAIRU stands for the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment. Theoretically, unemployment 
rate below the NAIRU level will increase inflation. 
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economic issues such as weak budgetary discipline. This makes the former high-
inflation country more vulnerable to speculative attacks and a sovereign debt crisis in 
the monetary union. (Corden, 1972; De Grauwe, 2018, pp. 41–49.) 
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4 THEORY OF OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS 
4.1 Traditional approach 
The theory of optimum currency areas (OCA-theory) attempts to answer the question 
of which or what kind of countries or regions should adopt a common currency and 
form a monetary union. As the costs and benefits of a common currency are generally 
acknowledged, the puzzle is to examine how well countries or regions can deal with 
the negative effects and are the benefits worth it. If economies were identical, the task 
would be easy on paper, but in reality, countries and even regions within might vary a 
lot making the deliberation difficult. 
In the 1960s capital controls and fixed exchange regimes, for instance, Bretton Woods8 
were common. Canada was one of the few examples to utilize a flexible exchange rate 
regime. This was seen as risky due to exchange rate fluctuations (Mundell, 1961). 
Probably the European integration after World War II motivated economists to take a 
more elaborate look into international economics and monetary integration. The idea 
of the OCA-theory was first introduced by Robert Mundell in 1961 and a bit later 
developed further by McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). Without exception, these 
three economists are mentioned in the literature about the development of the OCA-
theory. In 1999 Mundell received a Nobel prize for his work in monetary dynamics 
and optimum currency areas. The recognition was obviously associated with the birth 
of the EMU. Prior to Mundell, economists such as Lerner (1944, 1947), Friedman 
(1953), Meade (1957), Scitovsky (1958, pp. 79–99) and Ingram (1959) have put forth 
some thoughts about exchange rate regimes. Lerner (1944, pp. 370–377) recognized 
the macroeconomic properties of the gold standard that are still valid in monetary 
economics. Later he pointed out the value of labor mobility as a smoothening factor 
between unemployment and wage pressure (Lerner, 1947). Also, Meade and Scitovsky 
have emphasized the importance of labor mobility which is a determinant in choosing 
an exchange rate regime. According to Scitovsky, a fixed exchange rate regime 
 
8 Bretton Woods was a monetary system in which various western currencies were fixed to the US 
dollar, that was for its part fixed to the gold standard. The system existed between 1944–1971. 
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encourages capital mobility among countries whereas Friedman’s contribution was an 
in-depth analysis of flexible exchange rates. Ingram weighed monetary integration as 
crucial for achieving a functioning monetary union. 
4.1.1 Mundell 
In summary Mundell’s theory implies that common currency is optimal in areas that 
have a sufficiently high level of factor mobility. In his terms factor mobility is both 
labor and capital mobility. He states followingly, “If the world can be divided into 
regions within each of which there is factor mobility and between which there is factor 
immobility. Then each of these regions should have a separate currency which 
fluctuates relative to all other currencies” (Mundell, 1961, pp. 663). A slightly more 
explicit definition could be that the regions without unemployment or inflation issues 
have an optimal exchange rate regime, whether it is fixed or floating. However, 
Mundell’s theory does not take national borders into account in forming single 
currency areas, although he recognizes them as a potentially restrictive feature. 
(Mundell, 1961.) 
He argues that the flexible currency regime is ineffective if industrial regions do not 
correspond with national boundaries. On the other hand, he adds that the most 
favorable case of flexible exchange rates is an asymmetric shock between two 
countries, which they defeat with national monetary policy instruments. Both of these 
arguments are still considered to be economically valid and a basis for the modern 
approach of optimum currency areas. Also, Mundell’s statement about the factor 
mobility being a crucial feature in the automatic adjustment process is generally 
acknowledged as it is mentioned in chapter two. Nevertheless, Mundell cannot answer 
what is the sufficient level of factor mobility for an optimum currency area, but the 
optimal region is neither the whole world nor an individual consumer. (Mundell, 
1961.) 
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4.1.2 McKinnon 
McKinnon expands Mundell’s idea of optimum currency areas by taking into account 
a country’s openness. His main proposition is that open, hence usually small countries 
are favorable to form an optimum currency area. In this case, openness particularly 
indicates the ratio between tradable and non-tradable production. Also, typically 
economic openness and the small size of a country go hand in hand because the 
presumption is that a small country does not have the resources to be self-sufficient. 
McKinnon’s view of optimum is that a single currency area can achieve the best 
combination of the following three objectives: full employment, the balance of 
international payments, and a stable internal average price level. (McKinnon, 1963.) 
McKinnon’s assumption is that small countries’ domestic exchange rates or currency 
prices do not influence the international price level of tradable production, hence the 
prices of tradable goods are given. Under the floating exchange rate regime, an open 
and small economy is therefore more vulnerable to price fluctuations or in McKinnon’s 
terms, ‘unwanted speculative movements in a floating exchange rate’. This harms the 
third objective of maintaining internal price stability. An optimal decision would be a 
policy of completely fixed exchange rates. De Grauwe (2018, pp. 51–52) clarifies 
McKinnon’s view by explaining that exchange rate fluctuations can stimulate the 
exports of a country thus the openness is advantageous. Nevertheless floating 
exchange rates can hit the other way around and adversely raise the costs of imports. 
The shifts are more intensive in a relatively open economy than a closed one, he adds. 
Even if the supply and demand effects were balanced in the long run, the aggregate 
price level would undergo harmful fluctuations resulting in inflationary booms and 
unemployment from recessions. National monetary policy tools are used to control the 
exchange rate shifts and they can dampen the shocks. However, the systematic use of 
the monetary policy instruments probably leads to additional fluctuations in the 
exchange rates and then the aggregate price level is constantly in motion. As said, in a 
relatively open economy the shifts are stronger and require intervention from monetary 
authorities. This is costly and makes a monetary union seem more attractive choice 
compared to the floating exchange rate regime. 
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4.1.3 Kenen 
The third early OCA influencer, Kenen (1969) thinks that the countries with well-
diversified economy are the most appropriate or – the least inappropriate candidates to 
form an optimum currency area. The diversified economy refers to a wide range of 
production and exports and thus consumption and imports. The main idea is that 
diversification minimizes the damage from inevitable asymmetric shocks in a 
monetary union and the explanation is based on the law of large numbers. It is highly 
unlikely that economic shocks affect a country’s production and exports holistically if 
they are widely diverse. An opposite amplified effect takes place in a poorly diversified 
single-product country. If the before mentioned country was a member state of a 
monetary union, it could not use national monetary policy instruments to raise the 
sunken demand. The point is that asymmetric shocks hit the single-product countries 
harder and therefore economically diversified countries are more suitable to form an 
optimum currency area. Although, Kenen admits that his argument is not valid if the 
diversified economy faces, in his terms, business-cycle swings that affect the entire 
spectrum of production and exports. He writes that developed countries should perhaps 
join the Bretton Woods regime and less developed, thus less diversified countries, are 
likely better to resort to a completely flexible regime. An interesting unrelated remark 
is that the Bretton Woods system collapsed just two years later after publishing his 
paper. 
Kenen’s (1969) incentive to participate in the discussion was that he thought Mundell 
having too simplistic assumptions of factor mobility or particularly labor mobility 
being a cure for asymmetric shocks between two regions. Mundell’s optimum currency 
areas are not found on an ordinary map but rather formulated with the use of an input-
output table, he writes. The argument was that in a real-world situation the labor force 
is not as mobile as Mundell’s theory requires. On the other hand, Kenen believes that 
Mundell’s internal factor mobility intensifies after diversified countries have formed a 
fixed exchange rate regime. Also, McKinnon’s view on the OCA-theory was in 
contradiction to Kenen’s. The former rests on the economic openness which is typical 
for small countries as opposed to the economic diversification which for one part is 
more likely for larger countries. Briefly, small economies tend to specialize in specific 
industries due to lack of resources and large economies tend to diverse because 
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resources allow it. So generally, McKinnon’s optimal single currency countries would 
not accomplish Kenen’s criterion and vice versa. However, Kenen did not discuss 
McKinnon’s point of view apart from introducing his definition of optimality 
concerning the OCA-theory. 
It is noteworthy to mention, that Kenen is among the first, who takes the importance 
of common fiscal policy into account regarding the optimum currency areas. 
According to him, fiscal and monetary policies constitute a policy mix that should be 
in use within the same domain, for example, a currency area. Fixed exchange rate 
regime cannot altogether eliminate imperfect labor mobility or export fluctuations but 
then budgetary policies, for example transfer payments, come into play. DeGrauwe 
(2018, pp. 17–19) argues that adopting a budgetary union with fiscal transfers is the 
only way to form a complete functional monetary union and it is a necessary step for 
the Eurozone as well. 
4.1.4 Criticism 
In the 1970s the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the so-called Werner report 
of European economic and monetary union (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1970) likely induced economists to take the discussion of the OCA-
theory and monetary integration forward. Corden (1972) proposes an exact opposite 
argument contrary to McKinnon’s openness- optimal view. According to Corden, the 
more open the economy, the greater are the gains from exchange rate variability 
provided that economic shocks are external or in his terms, of macro nature. If 
domestic factor costs are stable, but foreign prices and costs are fluctuating, then the 
country is experiencing external instability through exchange rates. Monetary 
authority’s proper exchange rate adjustments can protect the domestic economy from 
foreign shocks. Theoretically, the perfect result is to exactly offset foreign price 
changes so the domestic price level remains unchanged and foreign trade risk is 
reduced. Hence the domestic currency has kept its liquidity and the exchange rate risk 
does not occur as the real price level is unaltered. In Corden’s words, exchange rate 
variations fulfill an insulation role. (Corden, 1972.) 
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In case the exchange rate variations are micro by nature, that is to say, caused by 
demand or supply shifts domestically while the foreign price level is stable, then 
McKinnon is right. If economic disturbances are endogenous, then a fixed exchange 
rate regime is favorable due to the price stability it brings. Corden gives an example 
of Germany before it joined the Euro. Germany is able to maintain price stability 
within its borders but faces rising prices abroad. If it does not adjust the exchange rate 
but keeps it constant in a fixed manner, the domestic price stability will take hit through 
the foreign trade. The domestic costs could stay the same but as the import prices rise, 
it will affect the entire domestic price level, thus Germany has to comply with the 
foreign disequilibria. Hence, inflation is imported. In this case, the more open the 
country, the more it will suffer from the inflation brought abroad and McKinnon’s 
argument becomes invalid. Germany could implement an exchange rate appreciation 
that will even out the inflationary foreign price shifts. This, of course, is not possible 
in a monetary union, because the exchange rate is fixed and that is the reason why 
Corden argues against McKinnon’s view in the first place. It is worth emphasizing that 
the appropriate viewpoint depends on the cause of price level disturbances. (Corden, 
1972.) 
Corden’s skepticism goes a little deeper. Even if an open country could reach price 
stability through a fixed exchange regime, as McKinnon assumes, Corden doubts that 
the country would obtain any gains from the monetary union. The more open the 
country is in terms of tradable and non-tradable production, the less costly is the fixed 
exchange rate compared with a relatively closed country. The actual gains are 
somewhere else, he says. The benefits of a monetary union are already brought up, but 
admittedly they probably were not present in the 1970s to the same degree as nowadays 
or at the time when the EMU was established. On the other hand, Corden believes that 
a monetary union is a rational choice if an individual country cannot for a reason or 
another maintain its currency. There will be difficulties and a risk that the factual 
money in use is not the own currency but some key currency for example dollar from 
abroad. A monetary union is a way to escape the currency crisis by means of borrowing 
credibility from the union. Nevertheless, he thought that apart from the micro-nations, 
all the member states of the European Economic Community were feasible currency 
areas on their own and probably better off without a monetary union. (Corden, 1972.) 
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Ishiyama (1975) represents a critique of the 1960s OCA approach from Mundell, 
McKinnon, and Kenen. In the traditional approach, the currency area optimality rests 
on a single criterion of some economic attributes. For Mundell it is factor mobility, 
McKinnon suggests openness and Kenen- the diversity of production. The optimality 
itself is measured by standard objectives of economy such as low unemployment, price 
stability, and a balance of payments equilibrium. Mundell distributes regions regarding 
factor mobility and immobility until the desirable economic stability is achieved. He 
writes that the greater the number of separate currency areas in the world, the more 
successfully the stability is reached, which supposedly implies tiny single currency 
regions. The small regions are particularly vulnerable for speculative attacks and the 
minor currency loses its credibility as a medium of exchange. Hence, the stability from 
factor mobility is canceled by the instability caused by a minor currency. 
According to Ishiyama (1975), Mundell does not separate labor and capital mobility 
from each other, which is a rather too simple assumption. Generally, labor mobility 
and capital mobility do not have the same conditions, even though they can be 
somewhat correlated. The former bears social restrictions such as cultural differences, 
the latter does not, but it has something else affected by. Hence, the shifts of these two 
are not uniform.  
Supposing that aggregate demand shifts from country B to country A under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Unemployment rises and price level declines in country B. An 
opposite takes place in A. The deflationary environment in country B leads to a 
situation in which saving is preferable contrary to investing and the unemployment 
grows even further. In this case, the capital is immobile but deep recession might 
motivate labor to move from country B to A. In other words, labor and capital 
mobilities have distinct directions demonstrating Mundell’s assumption ambiguous. 
The more crucial and more injurious expectation is that interregional labor mobility is 
factually enough to enable Mundell’s theory. Here the following social restrictions 
come into play; language barrier, different habits, cultural differences, and the effort 
of moving to an unfamiliar environment. Scitovsky writes that “There is plenty of 
evidence that labor moves reluctantly and only as a last resort even within the same 
country” (Scitovsky, 1967, pp. 523). Corden (1972) also believes that labor immobility 
is certainly more realistic than high labor mobility. Moreover, he points out that 
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particularly high labor mobility is harmful and inflicts social and economic costs, 
provided that all the unemployed workers move somewhere else and serve as effective 
Mundellian factor mobility. This leads to real-wage differences in the monetary union, 
even though the labor is mobile. After all, Corden thinks that labor mobility is an 
insufficient substitute for flexible exchange rates.  
Later Mundell (1973) came up with an idea that financial integration in a single 
currency area provides insurance and thus dampens asymmetric shocks. In his 
example, two islands with own currencies practice trade with two island-specific 
crops, which have completely contrary growing seasons. Economies are fine as long 
as the trade is in balance and the number of crops is equal. If the crop production in 
either island differs from the long term, this means it is hit by an asymmetric shock, 
then the currency takes a hit as well and the island dwells into an economic problem. 
In Mundell’s case, it would have been about life and death, as the islanders would have 
starved without the crops from the other island. A common currency could have 
increased credibility among the islands due to the absence of exchange, and the money 
borrowing would have been easier. In terms of risk-sharing, a common currency 
reserve pool could have helped with the seasonal asymmetric shocks as well. It is 
worth noting that the shocks must be temporary because the islands will not loan 
money to one another indefinitely. Something else must be done if the crops do not 
grow. Again, Ishiyama (1975) finds Mundell’s argument vague and intuitive and does 
not identify the benefit of risk pooling. On the other hand, De Grauwe (2018, pp. 49–
50) finds that now Mundell advocates the single currency regime, because of the 
above-mentioned financial integration and that asymmetric shocks are caused by 
exchange rate fluctuations and not vice versa. In other words, exchange rates are not 
the tool against asymmetric shocks, but they might be the reason or at least an 
amplification for the shocks. De Grauwe writes that there is a lot of evidence that 
exchange rate movements are often disconnected from underlying economic 
fundamentals and therefore psychological factors have a greater role instead.  
In the case of McKinnon, one can conclude that Ishiyama agrees for the most part with 
the proposed arguments but the theory fails on the same strict assumptions that Corden 
(1972) finds problematic. Firstly, the principal cause of the balance of payment 
disturbances is originated in microeconomic changes in country’s aggregate supply 
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and demand. Secondly, the rest of the world maintains price stability. If the 
surrounding world is required to be more stable than a small open country, then the 
preconditions for the prevailing theory are too harsh. Ishiyama emphasizes that the 
world economy in the 1970s is less and less stable than it was in the 1950s or 60s, thus 
the real world does not support the viewpoint of external price stability. (Ishiyama, 
1975.) 
The argument that McKinnon did not himself clearly introduce, but is derived from 
his theory, is the absence of money illusion and the diminishing power of using a 
flexible exchange rate. If the portion of imports is considerably large of consumption 
in a small and open country, then the real income effect of flexible exchange rate 
fluctuations is so noticeable that the domestic firms and consumers do not accept it 
without a reaction. For example, monetary authorities of a small and open country 
would try to stimulate the aggregate demand with a depreciation of the currency. As 
the imports are in a major role of the production, they directly reflect to the prices of 
end-products, and the desired stimulating effect of flexible exchange rate instrument 
disappears. The same applies to wages and consumption within the country. This 
absence of money illusion makes the flexible exchange rate an inefficient tool to 
correct external disturbances. Also, in small and open countries, there is usually a lack 
of domestic substitutes for imported products or even services. Thus, the price 
elasticity of imports with respect to an exchange rate is relatively low and the required 
exchange rate change for adjusting the balance of payments is high. Therefore, the 
fixed exchange rate becomes a more attractive choice for small and open economies. 
(Ishiyama, 1975.) 
Regarding Kenen, Ishiyama states that his proposition of economic diversity and a 
correct exchange rate regime seems to be so simple, that his formal model is pointless. 
The mathematical model implicitly assumes that labor supply is infinitely elastic with 
respect to a nominal wage rate. The assumption is rather unrealistic, but still necessary 
for the formal model, which implies that only the essential thesis of Kenen should be 
considered. Basically, the only proposition Kenen delivers is the law of large numbers 
within international trade. (Ishiyama, 1975.) 
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Frankel and Rose (1996) also find Kenen’s diversification argument logically 
questionable. The drawback lies within the criterion of how an optimum currency area 
is defined. Supposing that two diversified regions form a monetary union, the 
combined area becomes more diversified than the individual regions were initially. A 
third sufficiently diversified region is willing to join the union and thereby the 
combined diversity grows even more with a wider margin. The mechanism allows that 
the new joining regions do not necessarily have to be so diversified, assuming the 
union’s combined diversity will increase. As the process continues, eventually the 
entire world will be an optimum currency area, which was not Kenen’s intention. The 
illustration works the other way around as well. If the individual region is not 
sufficiently diversified in the first place, it should be divided into smaller units that 
have their own floating currencies. Again, the process will continue until the world 
consists only of completely specialized individuals. This indicates that Kenen’s view 
does not have an equilibrium in which the regions are satisfied, because continuous 
expansion increases economic diversity. To some degree, similar nitpicking could be 
applied to McKinnon’s and Mundell’s viewpoints from which Mundell noticed the 
issue first. The main purpose is likely to emphasize the characteristic nature of the 
OCA-theory rather than falsify Kenen. It is difficult to determine what is the sufficient 
or alternatively insufficient level of diversity, openness or factor mobility to fulfill the 
criteria of optimum currency areas. Nevertheless, Frankel and Rose suggest that 
economic specialization is rather a more appropriate feature for the OCA-theory 
instead of diversity. This is because, in a real-world situation, regions tend to approach 
the midway and not the above-mentioned extremes. On the other hand, Frankel and 
Rose admit that governments might not strictly follow the optimum currency area 
criteria in choosing the exchange rate regime, implying that the OCA-theory is not a 
bunch of rules, but guidelines that could lead regions or in fact countries to 
economically preferable positions. 
Apart from the author-specific criticism, Ishiyama points out that the early 
contributions of the optimum currency area theory lack a concept of comparing the 
benefits of a fixed exchange regime to the costs it brings. Certainly, the economists 
recognized and understood the reciprocal property of adopting a fixed exchange rate, 
as there is no such thing as a free lunch, but the idea of cost-benefit analysis was not 
clearly put forth by the early contributors. They rather pondered what sort of regions 
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should adopt a fixed exchange rate. The pros and cons of a monetary union are not 
static and therefore not easily comparable. Presumably, a simple quantitative measure 
of positive gains or losses such as an increase in GDP, is impossible to discern. The 
costs and benefits take place in several different domains in the economy however, 
they are distinct yet not commensurate. (Ishiyama, 1975.) 
The traditional approach of the 1960s OCA theorists gives important insights but does 
not sufficiently cover various issues with comparisons nor definitions and generally 
remains quite ambiguous. Therefore, Ishiyama suggests an alternative approach, 
which takes the costs and benefits of a common currency explicitly into account. 
(Ishiyama, 1975.) Indeed this is the basis for the modern approach of optimum 
currency area theory. Difficulties in finding a theoretical consensus and building a 
precise cost-benefit analysis indicate that the OCA-theory is primarily an academic 
discussion, which does not provide many solutions to practical problems of exchange 
rate policy. Willett and Tower (1970, 1976) somewhat agree with Ishiyama, that the 
unified theory of optimum currency areas does not exist. Thus, there is no general 
agreement on the relative importance of the proposed factors, concerning an optimal 
exchange rate regime, and it will probably remain like that. Attaining a strict unified 
theory is a fallacy. On the other hand, the concept of optimum currency areas offers 
useful information and increases the discussion around fixed versus flexible exchange 
rates. Consequently, economies are more aware and might deliberate alternative 
exchange rate regimes, even if they are not willing for a reform. Lastly, Willett and 
Tower state that the decision of forming a currency area is of course ultimately a 
political one. Similarities in cultural heritage, language, politics, and ideology are 
factors that affect the incentive to operate in a group, but economic benefits can 
outweigh them. Members are ready to make compromises and give up some social 
similarity if the result is a successful currency area. 
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4.1.5 Summary of different perspectives 
Tavlas (1993) summarizes the characteristics or rather preconditions of the potential 
members for an optimum currency area. The criteria are based on the early literature 
of the subject and later dealt with in economics textbooks. (See Baldwin & Wyplosz, 
2015; De Grauwe, 2018; Gandolfo, 1987; Salvatore, 1993). The following 
characteristics have been proposed as relevant for the potential countries to form an 
optimum currency area: 
1) The similarity of inflation rates. Similar inflation rates tend to balance the flows of 
interregional current account transactions within the currency area compared to 
divergent inflation rates. (Fleming, 1971.) 
2) The degree of factor mobility. Factor mobility provides a substitute for exchange 
rate flexibility as a tool for dealing with external disturbances. Therefore, the countries 
with a high degree of factor mobility are preferable for forming an optimum currency 
area. (Mundell, 1961.) 
3) The openness and size of the economy. Open and small economies are potential 
members for an optimum currency area because a fixed exchange rate protects the 
economies from significant effects of price fluctuations. Also, the fixed exchange rate 
provides liquidity, as the price level fluctuates less in closed economies than relatively 
open ones. (McKinnon, 1963.) 
4) The degree of commodity diversification. If a country’s production and thus the 
exports and imports are highly diversified, the country is a potential member for a 
currency area. The math behind the diversification lowers the risk of being hit by 
significant shocks and eliminates the need for frequent exchange rate adjustments. 
(Kenen, 1969.) 
5) Price and wage flexibility. If prices and wages are flexible within regions, then the 
need for exchange rate adjustment is nonexistent. Unemployment and inflation that are 
originated from asymmetric shocks, will be automatically stabilized through the price 
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and wage flexibility making the exchange rate policy unnecessary. (Friedman, 1953; 
Kawai, 1987.) 
6) The degree of goods market integration. Countries with similar production 
structures nullify the effectiveness of exchange rate adjustment between the countries 
in case they face symmetric terms-of-trade shocks. Therefore, the countries are better 
off forming a currency area. (Mundell, 1961.) 
7) Fiscal Integration. A high level of fiscal integration between countries increases the 
ability to deal with asymmetric shocks, through fiscal transfers. Transactions take 
place from low-unemployment countries to high-unemployment countries balancing 
the divergence. Usually, some form of political union is associated with the 
interregional high-level fiscal integration. (Kenen, 1969.) 
8) The need for real exchange rate variability. Criteria from one to seven are difficult 
to measure accurately and lack an actual way to measure them, so comparing might be 
impossible. In turn, real exchange rate changes are easily measurable from historical 
data, and thus conclude whether the exchange rate instrument is necessary for a 
country or not. (Vaubel, 1976, 1978.) 
9) Political factors. The major and perhaps the only real condition for establishing a 
monetary union is the political will to integrate with the other compatible and 
likeminded countries (Mintz, 1970, pp. 33). The view has support from Cohen’s (1993) 
empirical study. Political factors are found to be superior to the economic criteria in 
successful currency areas. 
4.2 Modern views 
The theory of optimum currency area received only a little attention from the mid-
1970s until the mid-1980s. Probably the reason for it was that the OCA-theory or the 
researchers among it could not bring forth anything new or interesting. The OCA-
theory could not answer whether a region is a currency area or not. Also, the lack of 
practical use encouraged economists to study something more topical. In Tavlas 
(1993), The ‘New’ Theory of Optimum Currency Areas - paper he writes that “the 
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subject was for years consigned to intellectual limbo”, which imbued the discussion 
around the subject. Though a lot of studies were done in recent years before him and 
the so-called Delors report (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary 
Union, 1989) and the Maastricht treaty (Commission of the European Communities, 
1992) also increased academic interest toward the topic. Tavlas says that the ‘new’ 
theory is faithful to the traditional approach as a starting point and follows the 
methodology and above-mentioned criteria in constituting a single currency area. The 
‘new’ indicates that a few points make a fixed exchange regime a bit less costly and a 
bit more beneficial than it was viewed earlier (Tavlas, 1993). 
Firstly, in the traditional approach, it is assumed that the trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation is permanent. Thus, a desirable point on the Phillips-curve 
is achieved through a flexible exchange rate policy, but the curve itself cannot be 
escaped. Gradually, as the subject developed, the assumption got refuted. First, the 
Friedman-Phelps hypothesis demonstrates that steady-state unemployment is not 
related to steady-state inflation when the Phillips relationship includes a variable 
representing the expected inflation rate, id est, an augmented Phillips-curve. (Tavlas, 
1993.) 
Secondly, Robert Lucas’s work on unemployment and inflation relationship shows 
that even in the short run and under perfect conditions, anticipated changes in policy 
do not have an impact on real variables. Perfect knowledge of money stock changes 
does not affect supply or employment variables (McCallum, 1989, pp. 187). Thirdly, 
many countries suffered from rising unemployment associated with rising inflation in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, which is against the Phillips-curve concept. 
As mentioned in chapter three, works of Barro and Gordon (1983) and earlier Kydland 
and Prescott (1977) pointed out that a high-inflation country is not imprisoned on its 
Phillips-curve, but it can by decision adopt a fixed exchange rate from some other 
country that can maintain credibility and low inflation. This is a major feature of 
Tavlas’s ‘new’ OCA-theory. The traditional approach assumed the country-specific 
position of the Phillips-curve as somewhat given and structural and therefore a similar 
inflation level must be considered as a precondition for optimum currency area. 
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Inflation disadvantages such as; money’s declined role as a store of value, uncertainty 
over future prices, and menu costs are widely known. (Tavlas, 1993.) 
Constant high inflation indicates that monetary authorities and government policies of 
a country are neither stable or credible. Bad reputation from inflationary policymaking 
leads to a long and costly process in case the country desires to achieve a low inflation 
level by itself (De Grauwe, 1992; Giavazzi & Pagano, 1988; Mélitz, 1988.)  
Barro and Gordon (1983) and also De Grauwe (2018, pp. 41–49) argue that the 
disinflationary process must be time consistent. This means that policymakers have an 
incentive to execute short-term policies such as electoral terms, which will reduce 
unemployment under the NAIRU level. Economic agents know this and most likely 
adjust their expectations of inflation. This continues as long as the inflation level 
equals the NAIRU unemployment level on the Phillips-curve. In other words, 
policymakers might cheat votes by practicing policy that reduces unemployment but 
results in inflation. A drawback is that policymakers lose their credibility, which will 
complicate the attempt of honest disinflationary policy in case they desire to practice 
it. The public will not believe that policymakers are willing to maintain a low-inflation 
policy unless they provide evidence about it. If the announced plausible policy does 
not function, the public and economic agents will adjust their inflation expectations, 
again leading to higher inflation than would be possible to achieve. The policy is not 
time consistent and lacks credibility. This especially makes the disinflationary process 
long and arduous. Also, if the public accepts the assertion as it is announced, the 
policymakers have an incentive to renege it and the vicious circle keeps ongoing. 
(Tavlas, 1993.) 
The other way to gain credibility is the currency substitution that is introduced in 
chapter three. A high-inflation country forms a monetary union with a low-inflation 
country, but in the way that the credible low-inflation country is dominant and controls 
the monetary policy. Otherwise, the high-inflation country might bring its inefficient 
policy into monetary union. If the formation is appropriate, neither of the countries has 
to bear long-term costs from it (De Grauwe, 2018 pp. 41–49; Giavazzi & Giovannini, 
1989 pp. 86–104). Inevitably, the countries might vary adversely in the long run, 
increasing the costs of monetary unification but it is not related to the formation. In 
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turn, the high-inflation country immediately gains the advantages of low inflation from 
the monetary union (De Grauwe, 1992). 
De Grauwe gives an empirical example of credibility borrowing or ‘tying the hands’ 
as he says, from the unification of Germany. Due to economic liberalization in 1990 
East Germany was hit by a shock declining the aggregate demand for East German 
and additionally East European products. According to the traditional approach, East 
and West Germany did not form an optimum currency area and East Germany would 
have been better off if it had implemented the economic reform while having an own 
currency in use and kept it for some time. Theoretically, exchange rate adjustment 
would have dampened the negative demand shock and according to De Grauwe, many 
economists were skeptical towards the German monetary integration for this reason. 
Emigration from East to West was intense which indicates that a high level of mobility 
occurred which in turn supports the old theory according to which East and West 
Germany would form an optimum currency area. On the other hand, labor mobility 
was almost exclusively from East to West and the movement of East Germans was 
restricted. Also, labor mobility could have been an expensive way of adjusting, 
because the emigrants were mostly young and skilled. East Germany would have 
depopulated its most efficient workforce, which would have led to a decline in already 
low productivity. In a monetarist view, East Germany would have benefitted from a 
monetary union, as devaluation and exchange rate adjustments are seen inefficient and 
illusionary. The Keynesian view would have been contrary to this and the traditional 
approach mainly rests on it, but the theory is influenced by monetarism too. To 
illustrate, McKinnon was afraid of the absence of money illusion in small and open 
countries. (De Grauwe, 1992.) 
Nevertheless, both East and West Germany did unite despite what the traditional 
approach says. In 1991 industrial production declined by 50% and inflation rose by 
5% in East Germany. At the same time, Poland was undergoing a similar economic 
liberalization program but without monetary integration. For comparison, Poland’s 
industrial production declined by 19% and inflation rose by 250% in the same period. 
The numbers can be interpreted in a way that East Germany suffered from an 
immediate negative output effect more than Poland. This gives some support to the 
traditional approach stressing the costliness of asymmetric shocks and in that case, 
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own currency can be useful for adjustment purposes. Whatsoever, the evidence is not 
that unambiguous and the overall liberalization process might have been quite 
divergent between these two countries. The unification of Germany was implemented 
rather fast. Another difference, in addition to monetary integration or its absence, 
between East Germany and Poland was fiscal transfers. Large subsidies from West 
Germany to East Germany led to an increase in disposable income, despite the 
industrial production fell by 50%. Without the budgetary transfers from the West, East 
Germany would have fallen into a deep depression. Most likely Poland would have 
experienced the same. This emphasizes the importance of active fiscal policy between 
the regions within a monetary union at least in the case of Germany. According to the 
traditional approach, there has to be some kind of automatic adjustment system for 
satisfactory monetary integration. Germanys had fiscal transfers and therefore can be 
concluded that they form an optimum currency area. (De Grauwe, 1992.) 
East Germany was not a high-inflation country, but during and after the liberalization 
process it probably would have been if it would have not adopted the credible and 
stable West German currency. After an elimination of price controls on basic 
commodities, the initial effect of economic liberalization tends to significantly 
increase the prices. The numbers again support the proposition as Poland’s inflation 
was 250% and East Germany’s only 5%. The new approach suggests that a monetary 
union with a strong and credible country is a less costly and, in some cases, the only 
way to reach a low inflation level, provided that the government and monetary 
authorities are not truly capable of achieving it by themselves. (De Grauwe, 1992.) 
The second point Tavlas wants to put forth is labor mobility under uncertainty. He 
refers to Bertola’s (1989, pp. 95) microeconomic research on costly reallocation under 
uncertainty and the result is that the more uncertain the environment, the less should 
be the willingness to undertake adjustments. The model has been applied to Mundell’s 
factor mobility concept and can be concluded that uncertain income reduces the 
willingness to move to another location even if the initial location has uncertain 
income as well. This is due to the fixed costs of moving between the two locations. 
The economic agent fears that if she in future moves back to the initial location, the 
wage differentials might be unfavorable and the migration will be costly. Another issue 
is that if they are in the new location with a significantly higher income level, it will 
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induce others to move there and consequently the earnings will decline, which leaves 
the economic agent worse off. In its entirety, income level variability is generally a 
negative phenomenon. Bertola proposes with the Mundell-Fleming model, that 
asymmetric shocks between two regions increase income variability under the fixed 
exchange rate regime. The solution is flexible exchange rates, so national monetary 
policy can be used to stabilize the income level differences and therefore activate labor 
mobility between the regions. The ultimate argument is that flexible exchange rates 
are an instrument against asymmetric shocks and a single currency regime can be 
adverse if the regions are economically too different. This proposition is familiar from 
chapter one. (Tavlas, 1993.) 
Tavlas’s third point is that exchange rate adjustments do not affect trade flows as fast 
as it was assumed in the traditional approach. The adjustments work appropriately, but 
there are lags between a new rate policy execution and the real effects in trade flows. 
Contemporary researchers such as Krugman (1991b, pp. 17) note that the lags are 
longer than previously expected or realized. The proposition can be rationalized for 
example with the portfolio-balance model. Economic agents are assumed to prefer 
domestic bonds over foreign ones because usually, they are more effortless or 
convenient to hold. An enduring current account deficit scares investors away and the 
country has to pay a higher risk premium for the government bonds to induce the 
investors back. As the investors tend to avoid remarkably risky bonds, the demand for 
domestic financial instruments declines and the demand for foreign financial 
instruments rises. Under perfect foresight, the current account affects the exchange 
rates through the risk premia paid on the bonds. The adjustment process is probably 
lengthy due to the cumulative movements of the current account. In other words, it 
depends on how willing the investors are to accept the higher domestic risk premia, or 
do they prefer the foreign financial instruments denominated in foreign currency. If a 
perfect foresight is realistically not present, then conditions for speculative bubbles 
arise, as exchange rates do not properly follow the economic fundamentals, but 
psychological factors. (Tavlas, 1993.) 
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De Grauwe takes the argument of disconnected exchange rates and trade flows a bit 
further. He adds the hypothesis of Ricardian equivalence9 to macroeconomic exchange 
rate dynamics. The expansionary fiscal policy reduces taxes and increases government 
spending. Consequently, according to the IS-LM-FX model, exchange rates should 
appreciate as the domestic interest rate rises, due to higher demand for financing. 
Under perfect foresight and Ricardian equivalence, economic agents know that the 
reduction in taxes and the increase in government spending will eventually lead to a 
budget deficit and the actions must be reversed. The expected future exchange rate 
depreciation will be instantly reflected with the present exchange rates and the ordinary 
appreciation does not take place in the first hand. The result indicates that the country’s 
fiscal policy is completely ineffectual to control the exchange rates, but indeed perfect 
foresight and Ricardian equivalence are harsh assumptions and rather serve as an 
illustration. If these assumptions are loosened, the dynamics of the IS-LM-FX model 
becomes valid, but likely with lags, that are longer than was earlier thought. (De 
Grauwe, 1989, pp. 157.) 
As the second and later the third stages of the EMU were approaching in the late 1990s, 
the focus of the scientific community somewhat shifted from theoretical pondering to 
empirical research under a presumption of the traditional theoretical framework. The 
single OCA preconditions of the traditional approach merged into a comprehensive 
economic integration between regions, which is a measure of optimum currency areas. 
Hence, this measure is used slightly differently in empirical research of ‘Is area X an 
optimum currency area?’, but the main point is that the majority of economists no 
longer debated the fundamental principles. Labor mobility, fiscal integration, trade 
integration and the rest were generally accepted as factors for a successful currency 
area. Although, some sporadic economists still wanted to speak out their opinions 
about the old OCA-theory. For example, McKinnon (2000, 2004) compared the 
decades-old theories of Mundell, even though the only real application under the 
concept of optimum currency areas was already implemented in the final stage of the 
 
9 Ricardian equivalence is a hypothesis according to which consumers consider the government’s budget 
constraint in their decision making in a way that the method of financing the government spending does 
not have an influence on private consumption. Hence, debt-financed government spending is 
ineffective. See Barro (1974) and Buchanan (1976). 
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EMU. Concerning the 1990s empirical approach, see Bayoumi, 1994; Bayoumi & 
Eichengreen, 1993a,b, 1994, 1996, 1997; De Grauwe & Vanhaverbeke, 1993; 
Eichengreen 1991; Fatás, 1997; Fidrmuc & Korhonen, 2001; Frankel & Rose 1996, 
1998; Karras, 1996; Ricci, 1997a,b; Stockman, 1988. These papers, such as many 
others around the subject try to either downright acknowledge whether there are certain 
regions or countries together an optimum currency area or bring forth discussion with 
some empirical findings. 
 
Figure 1. Business cycle symmetry, trade integration and the monetary regime (adapted from 
Frankel & Rose, 1998). 
Frankel and Rose (1998) list that; the extent of trade, the similarity of the shocks and 
cycles, the degree of labor mobility, and the system of risk-sharing are the four inter-
relationships between the potential members. In contemporary empirical research, 
these attributes were seen as given and were not questioned as during the traditional 
era. In figure 1 Frankel and Rose illustrate their views on the optimal exchange rate 
regime with respect to the extent of international trade and symmetry of shocks. One 
can notice that up to a certain point the mentioned attributes are interchangeable to 
cross the downward sloping OCA-line. Currently, the European Union consists of 27 
member states. It is uncertain whether all the EU-countries form an optimum currency 
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area, as economists have varying views on the issue. De Grauwe (2018, pp. 77) locates 
EU28 (pre-Brexit) below the OCA-line on his similar graph in which the international 
trade is replaced by flexibility. The United States lies above the line, due to a high 
level of labor mobility and often plays a role as a benchmark in the literature. 
Eichengreen (1991) compares Europe to the United States and Canada and implies that 
even the initial EU1510 does not form an optimum currency area. On the other hand, 
Artis and Zhang (1997) find that currency peg in Europe induces symmetry in business 
cycles and therefore countries would benefit from monetary union membership, 
provided that the predominant country is economically strong for example  Germany. 
Nevertheless, not all economists shared the same view of economic integration being 
univocally positive. For example, Krugman (1991a, 1993) thinks that economic 
integration between regions leads to a high level of specialization, that expose the 
regions for asymmetric shocks. Krugman is certainly not alone but primarily the 
contemporary empirical research was and still is based on the view that economic 
integration in some form reduces the harmful asymmetric shocks and therefore it is a 
factor of optimum currency areas. 
 
 
10 The EU15 comprised the following 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom. 
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5 FINLAND IN THE EMU 
The implementation of the euro currency in 1999 instituted the first real monetary 
union in which various countries with different languages and cultural backgrounds 
use one common currency. Previously monetary integration has attained only currency 
pegs, substitutions and other more lightweight versions between the countries. The 
fresh currency area drew attention among economists and was exposed to criticism. 
This criticism questioned whether the Euro area in effect brings the benefits, that the 
European Commission’s One market one money - report (1990) nearly promised. For 
instance, economists such as Feldstein (2000) and Krugman (1998, 2000) have been 
skeptical or even confrontational towards the euro. Jonung and Drea (2010) have 
written an entire paper mainly about  US academic economists' pessimistic views on 
the single currency in Europe during the 1990s. According to the authors, the US 
economists were using the traditional optimum currency area paradigm and thus found 
Europe as a weak basis for a successful monetary union. Labor mobility in Europe was 
viewed as inferior compared to the United States and especially the lack of sufficient 
cross-border fiscal transfers was the reasoning for the pessimistic attitude. This 
advocates the before mentioned argument, that the EMU or single currency in Europe 
was principally a political decision with only little economic rationalization. However, 
the literature on the early 2000s optimum currency areas is not only criticism and 
analysis of the euro. De Grauwe (2018, pp. 92–99) writes about research that 
contemplates the possibility of Africa, Asia or Latin-America forming optimum 
currency areas in their corresponding regions. Most likely the establishment of the 
EMU has induced the research on other continents. 
In this thesis, the interest is not in the entire Eurozone or the policy of the European 
Central Bank, because Finland has little to nonexistent power to influence these. 
Finland cannot choose what countries are members of the Eurozone or realistically 
affect the common monetary policy. Even if it could, Finland should in principle 
pursue benefits for the entire Eurozone and not only for itself. In other words, the 
combination of the member countries or monetary policy of the ECB can be viewed 
as exogenous factors in any case. In this matter, it is unreasonable to take a deeper look 
into the ECB or analyze whether the Eurozone forms an optimum currency area so that 
the interest rate and the configuration of member states are considered as given. Within 
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this framework, Finland can either choose to stay in the Eurozone or resign from it and 
reinstate the national currency, given that Finland is willing to maximize its economic 
utility. Probably this issue remains unanswered here, but some interesting viewpoints 
may arise. 
5.1 Background 
Finland’s decision of joining the third, final stage of the EMU was made on the 17th of 
April 1998 by votes of 135–61 in the Finnish parliament. The government perceived 
that it is Finland’s benefit to be among the first 11 members of the Eurozone in the 
core of the European integration. For example, the contemporary financial minister 
and current president of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, said in the media that it is inevitable 
to be among the first (mtv3, 1997).  
According to Karttunen’s doctoral dissertation, the elites in Finland and the EU15 
states were supporting European integration more than the public. The Finnish political 
elite is composed of seven different categories: political, administrative, business, 
social partners, media, science and culture (Ruostetsaari, 1992). For instance, 
chairpersons of political parties, leading officials of ministries and in the Bank of 
Finland as well as other state-owned institutions belong to the categories described 
above.  Karttunen’s data states that 68% of the Finnish elites were in favor of the EMU 
whereas the count of the public was only 29%. Corresponding numbers for the EU15 
states were 85% for the elite and 51% for the public. The results are not unusual. 
Gabel’s (1998) empirical analysis on the Eurobarometer statistics indicates that people 
with low income and low interest in politics perhaps tend to be against European 
integration or at least not support it. Katz (2001) also concludes that the European 
elites are more into the integration compared to the mass. (Karttunen, 2009.) 
Karttunen continues his statement about political elitism. According to him, political 
power is often in the hands of a few decision-makers, which are influenced by strong 
interest groups and parties. The leftist parties usually cooperate with trade or labor 
unions while agrarian parties collaborate with farmers’ unions and rightwing parties 
with employer organizations. The most eager supporters of European integration are 
among internal party elites who have cosmopolitan experiences and special knowledge 
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in relevant subjects. Thereby, these elites are more aware of the consequences of 
integration and have a personal interest behind it. Nevertheless, political parties stand 
for their core supporters, hence the voters, so the public should have an impact on 
decision making. This does not yet mean that polarization is not a real issue in politics. 
Another noteworthy point is that a close relationship exists between a party’s stance 
towards European integration and the party’s current position in parliament. The 
parties in the government or with long experience of being in the government, have 
mostly supported the integration, whereas the opposition parties have criticized it. 
(Karttunen, 2009.) In fact, this observation might be a bit obsolete in the modern 
political field, in which European integration receives criticism and support from right 
to left. 
The economic benefits of the EMU or monetary union, in general, have already been 
examined, but in regards to them, Karttunen (2009) points out that the recent academic 
literature from the 1990s and the economic logic of costs and benefits behind it, could 
explain why the EMU was launched in the 1990s. The benefits of a single currency 
could outweigh the loss of floating exchange rates. Paloheimo (1995, pp. 113–127) 
suggests that even so the economic interests were not the most important reasons for 
Finland’s EU-membership. The problems and probably fears of security due to 
historical reasons weighed more.  
Katzenstein (1985, pp. 47) writes that small European countries tend to choose 
strategies for security that suit in line with their strategies in economic matters. In turn, 
Karttunen (2009) mentions interlocking crises of the 1930s and 1940s such as; 
economic depression, fascism or World War II that influenced the politics in small 
European countries. Later the pressures of the Cold War and NATO membership 
emerged. “In general, historical experiences influence the EMU policy of a political 
party: the more unsupportive historical references there are, the greater the tendency 
to oppose a supranational policy” he writes (Karttunen, 2009, pp. 26). The Maastricht 
treaty and its implementation later, the EMU was essentially a German plan 
(Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). De Grauwe (2018, pp. 165–178) is mostly on the same line. 
The German model of central banking surpassed the Anglo-French model and became 
a prevailing approach in the ECB. The former focuses on price stability as its main 
objective and operates independently from political authorities. The latter has various 
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objectives and takes orders from the minister of finance instead. Along with economic 
reasons, the Germans had a particular strategic position in the EMU process. Karttunen 
proposes that the EMU was initially a part of a wider historical package deal between 
Germany and France. It seems that the major British, German and French parties have 
had a significant role in the European integration process (Johansson & Raunio, 2001, 
pp. 230). Furthermore, external authorities such as the United States have supported 
European integration after World War II in fear of socialism and anti-American 
policies, Karttunen adds. 
5.2 Jukka Pekkarinen EMU-report 
Finland has had a significant benefit from an active national monetary policy during 
the period after World War II up until the euro. The role of monetary policy 
instruments intensified when Finland began an open trade with the EU and other EFTA 
states. Devaluation has been a regular and systematic part of Finland’s economic 
policy and this has retained its competitiveness. (Karttunen, 2009.) Moses (1998, pp. 
94) suggests that monetary policy instruments have contributed to the Finnish 
economy probably more than any other European country. After 1945 Finland has had 
eleven devaluations, three revaluations, and one period of floating exchange rate to 
correct inflation and instability cycles (Boldt, 1999).  
Devaluations were practically executed in ten-year intervals to escape from these self-
induced recessions. The devaluation cycles were later viewed as rather harmful as they 
boosted certain export industries to the detriment of other sectors (Kiander, 2001). 
Korkman (1978, pp. 357–366) writes that the concept of a devaluation cycle was even 
introduced by Finnish economists. The tradition of exchange rate changes goes back 
to the early 1900s when Finland withdrew from the gold standard and let the markka 
decline in 1914 and consequently a few years later avoiding an international 
depression. Devaluation worked again in the 1930s Great Depression and Finland 
could bypass the hardest times and rebuild the economy (Moses, 1998, pp. 84). In 1991 
Finland fixed the markka to the ECU but only a few months later it had to devalue the 
currency due to liquidity issues from the banking crisis. After this, the markka was let 
to float freely against other currencies. (Karttunen, 2009.) 
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The above-mentioned implies that the national monetary policy has been a huge 
benefit to Finland, and relinquishing it would probably be a costly action. One could 
argue that the economic cost of a common currency seemed probably higher to Finland 
than in comparison with some other countries. At the end of 1996, the contemporary 
prime minister Paavo Lipponen set up an EMU-committee to deliberate potential 
advantages and disadvantages of the common euro currency to Finland. The group 
consisted of 12 Finnish experts and academics of economics from universities and 
other institutions. The chairman was professor Jukka Pekkarinen and the report is 
known by his name as well11 (called Pekkarinen report from now on). The report was 
groundwork for a separate Finnish government report, that was referred in political 
decision making on the subject12. 
Because of the short time frame, the Pekkarinen report was finished just in few months 
and therefore lacks deeper detailed research and quantitative analyses. The report 
neither provides a comprehensive conclusion about the solution the economists 
suggest to policymakers. The purpose of the committee was advisory and not to 
promote any political position. In fact, Pekkarinen was the economic policy advisor of 
the prime minister Lipponen, which obliged the committee to abstain from explicit 
recommendations. 
However, it is said that the report had an important role in two major parties’ decision 
making concerning the EMU. According to Karttunen (2009, pp. 98), the 
contemporary prime minister and SDP party leader Lipponen stated that, “if the 
conclusion or recommendation of Jukka Pekkarinen’s group had been clearly critical, 
it would have had a tremendous influence on the process”. Moreover, the NCP party 
leader Niinistö claimed that, “if most of the expert reports had been sharply negative, 
then the party would have rethought its position” (Karttunen, 2009, pp. 99). Also, 
Karttunen writes that economic goals were by far the most important EMU issue 
among the three major parties. Other issues were for instance, democracy and 
 
11 ’Jukka Pekkarinen report’ officially in Finnish Rahaliitto ja Suomi – talouden haasteet (EMU-
asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997). 
12 See Valtioneuvosto (1997). The government report is know as Talous- ja rahaliitto – Suomen 
vaihtoehdot ja kansallinen päätöksenteko, Valtioneuvoston selonteko eduskunnalle 20.5.1997. 
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internationalism. Based on this, it seems that to some extent politicians considered the 
OCA-theory and international economics at least indirectly via economists. 
On the other hand, Koskenkylä (2016) claims that entering the last stage of the EMU 
was practically certain and an automatic sequel to the EU-membership from 1995. 
Also, Kiander (2019) states that the Maastricht treaty in truth required Finland to join 
the EMU. Only Denmark and the UK had permission to postpone the EMU 
membership he continues. This brings up the question that did the Pekkarinen report 
have an impact after all, if the decision was already nearly made behind the scenes. 
Was the early adoption of the euro obvious to the major parties in a way that economic 
statements did not have actual weight? Perhaps not, but seemingly for example 
Sweden was more deliberative about joining the monetary union than Finland. A 
concrete example is that Finland did not have a separative referendum of the EMU 
unlike Sweden and Denmark (Koskenkylä, 2016). Possibly the political elites wanted 
to rush into the monetary union without inquiring the public opinion because being 
among the first states was seen as greatly valuable. Another example is that Sweden’s 
Calmfors EMU13 report is way more exploratory and detailed compared to the 
Pekkarinen report. The former has a cost-benefit comparing analysis, whereas the 
latter settled for more conversational form.  
The Finnish EMU-committee acknowledges the difference and says that the Calmfors 
report has been useful for the Finnish investigation as well (EMU-
asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, p. 15). The Swedish even have foreign viewpoints, for 
example, McKinnon and De Grauwe, that probably are rather unbiased. An American 
economist probably does not have a personal interest in whether Sweden or Finland 
has the euro or not, which is not a case with domestic economists. One could say that 
foreign academics favor the theory as opposed to domestic experts and decision-
makers who aim at the comprehensive national wellbeing, in which politics play a 
greater role. Nevertheless, for some reason, the Finnish prime minister assigned the 
EMU-committee rather late, and the Pekkarinen report remained as the only official 
investigation about the significance of the EMU (Koskenkylä, 2016). Therefore, the 
 
13 See Calmforsrapporten SOU 1996:158 (Calmfors et al., 1996). 
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report is an important part of the Finnish process in European integration and serves 
as an economic foundation for the EMU-membership, which now has continued for 
about two decades. 
The outsiders do not know how intense was the political game between the parties and 
interest groups or what was the factual weight of the economic investigation. It does 
not genuinely matter, because at present Finland is and probably stays in the Eurozone 
and in addition, the Pekkarinen report yet offers an economic perspective from the 
Finnish experts of their time. Hence, the report is worth  taking a deeper look into it. 
Below are the the main points of the report that represent views from the Finnish 
economists in 1997. 
5.2.1 Path to the euro 
European integration, as it is perceived today, began in the 1950s after World War II. 
The first official implementation of that was the European Coal and Steel Community, 
which was established to obtain common markets for coal and steel. In addition, the 
organization comprised wider security and social-political objectives for rebuilding 
post-war Europe, even if they were not officially stated. The original member states of 
the ECSC were so-called “Les Six”, which are Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. These countries combined the core of European 
integration. A bit later, in 1958 the European Economic Community was founded 
(EEC), which in 1967 merged with the ECSC and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) and became the European Community (EC). (EMU-
asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 21.) 
Finally, in 1993, after signing the Maastricht treaty, the European Community became 
the European Union (EU). At the time when the report was written, the EU could be 
described as intergovernmental multilateral cooperation and decision-making. By 
common agreement, the member states have relinquished part of their sovereignty (not 
just monetary policy like with the euro and ECB) to the supranational organs. Some 
sectors are more regulated than others. For instance, decision-making and control of 
the European internal market are highly supranational. Maastricht treaty meant quality 
majority voting within the union, but the basis of integration remained rather 
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unchanged. During the negotiations, suggestions about federal integration were 
rejected. The main activity of the EU is still concentrated in the member states and 
there aren’t any political controls and supervision, that are typical for federations. 
(EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 22–25.) 
European economic integration began in the 1950s as well, but nothing concrete was 
implemented or agreed before signing the Maastricht treaty. The Finnish EMU-
committee mentions two main schools, the economists and monetarists of how 
financial integration should proceed. Monetarists believed in a stable currency, which 
would bring the member states closer in terms of economic policy and -development. 
In addition, a stable currency would generally increase financial and political 
integration. Economists instead thought conversely that stable currency can be 
achieved only with inevitable economic integration between the member states. If the 
integration is insufficient, economic differences among the countries will eventually 
break the currency peg or lead to greater regional problems. (EMU-asiantuntijaryhmä, 
1997, pp. 23.) 
An idea of the European monetary union was proposed as early as 1962, but the plan 
did not succeed. Later, along with the problems of the Bretton Woods, member states 
of the EEC decided to begin a progressive path towards a monetary union. In 1970 the 
so-called Werner Report (Commission of the European Communities, 1970) covered 
these issues and the objective of the report was to achieve a monetary union before 
1980. The collapse of the Bretton Woods, the 1970s oil crisis and the inflation it caused 
and currency instability problems abolished the project. Also, free capital movements 
were seen as a potential threat that needed monitoring and responsible administration. 
Consequently, the European Monetary System (EMS) was established in 1979 to aim 
at lower instability between the currencies. At the same time the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the European Currency Unit (ECU) were launched. In 
practice, these acronyms meant a benchmark basket currency for the participant 
countries and only moderate fluctuations from that were allowed. National central 
banks agreed to practice policy that kept the domestic currency within the tolerance of 
the ECU. This is an example of a lighter version of monetary integration mentioned in 
the introduction. Finland was not officially a participant until 1991. (EMU-
asiantuntijaryhmä, 1997, pp. 23–25.) 
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In the late 1980s, new motives arose to take economic and monetary integration 
further. It was viewed that the full potential of internal markets cannot be reached due 
to exchange rate risks and commissions of different currencies. This argument can also 
be found from the European Commission’s One market, one money - report. The other 
issue was a combination of contractual currency peg (ECU) and free capital 
movements, which were rather an unprecedented reform. This tempted for speculative 
attacks, as the currency was not ‘hard-pegged’ but jus agreed to not fluctuate freely. 
Therefore, internal markets required a common currency, that would prevent 
speculative financial activity. The third issue was Germany’s strong position in the 
EMS. Ultimately Germany’s Bundesbank had indirectly control over the European 
monetary policy, as the strong and reliable deutschmark became de facto target 
currency in the EMS for the other countries. The Bundesbank’s monetary policy 
defends the interests and benefits of Germany and this can be problematic for the other 
member states if they happen to be in a different economic situation than Germany. 
Also, a loss of sovereignty to other countries is often viewed challenging as such. The 
idea of cure was to shift monetary power from Germany to a supranational central 
bank. The asymmetry in monetary power within the EMS provoked especially France 
to set up a committee to solve the above-mentioned issues. This is known as the Delors 
Committee and its propositions were a basis for the economic part of the Maastricht 
treaty. In addition to this, Delors Committee recognized the possibility for a common 
currency, yet as a distant objective in the future after deep financial integration. The 
Maastricht treaty focused on implementing concrete institutional solutions. From the 
treaty a progressive process of the EMU began, in which the third, final stage was to 
put new currency into effect. (EMU-asiantuntijaryhmä, 1997, pp. 25–29.) 
The EMU-committee thinks it is possible that in 1999, the EMU will loosen the 
convergence criteria14 of the Maastricht treaty so the number of member states will not 
be too small. Baldwin and Wyplosz (2015, pp. 350) also argue against small monetary 
unions. The more people accept a currency, the more useful it is, they write. The 
general weak economic growth makes it difficult to reach the criteria, but also political 
factors may have an effect in order to obtain enough member states when the euro 
 
14 The convergence criteria are comprised of numerical requirements for inflation, budget deficit, debt-
to-GDP ratio, exchange rate stability and long-term interest rates. 
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launches. For the future of the union it would be problematic if all the Mediterranean 
countries were rejected because they cannot fulfill the criteria. On the other hand, if 
economically insufficient countries are let into the monetary union, it might reduce the 
economic potential of common currency below what was first predicted. Credibility 
of the union takes a hit if something commonly agreed is immediately loosened. 
Furthermore, if the final stage of the EMU is postponed, it is also against the Maastricht 
treaty and indicates that participant states cannot hold on their economic promises. 
(EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 31–33.) 
With respect to Finland, the EMU-committee believes that is is among the member 
states that fulfill the convergence criteria. Reasoning for an early attendance of the last 
stage of the EMU lies in authority. Member states that participate the monetary union 
in the first wave, have power to define and affect policy of the union. The political 
elites saw this as a very important feature and opportunity. In a role of late-joiner, all 
the early policy decisions of the union are already made and the leaderboard positions 
filled. On the other hand, if joining was made later, Finland would have received 
experience on how the monetary union works in practice for example the currency 
stability and other policies, and how to get prepared for them. (EMU-
asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 34–36.) 
5.2.2 Utility of the monetary union 
The EMU-committee divides benefits of monetary union into two segments. The first 
are microeconomic effectivity increasing factors and the second are related to 
macroeconomic stability. The concrete benefits are basically the same as introduced 
in chapter three. The knowledge of costs and benefits have been established for long 
and on a theoretical level the validity is not often questioned. A larger issue is to 
determine a degree of costs and benefits. However, according to the report, Research 
Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) has estimated that the GDP benefit for 
Finland from the absence of foreign exchange market inside the Eurozone is 0.1%, in 
case Sweden and the UK participate the monetary union as well. (EMU-
asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 37–38.) 
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Costs related to protection against exchange rate risks would decline a bit more. 
Sweden ended up having somewhat similar numbers in their estimates. The Finnish 
committee emphasizes that for the potential benefits it is crucial that Sweden and the 
UK are part of the monetary union, as Finland has lots of trade with them. ETLA also 
estimates that common currency reduces all operating costs of firms and households 
by 0.5% of GDP if Sweden and the UK are again participating the union. (EMU-
asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 37–38.) 
The committee mentions that especially small countries like Finland benefit from a 
common currency more than greater ones. For instance, small currencies may look 
illiquid and come across as risky investments compared to the franc and deutschemark. 
In an ideal situation the overall average GDP advantage is estimated to be 0.4% and 
for small open countries 0.9% of GDP. It is noteworthy that these are just rough 
estimates and serve as some kind of numerical value for the potential benefits. Along 
with a common currency, Improvement of capital markets will probably also reduce 
the difference between banks’ deposit and withdrawal rates that vary a lot among the 
EU-states. Though Finland does not suffer from this as much as Southern European 
countries. In addition, the economists evaluate that foreign trade will increase and 
especially small and medium size enterprises benefit from it. (EMU-
asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 38–41.) 
The committee brings forth the OCA-theory and mentions that the convergence criteria 
of the Maastricht treaty is aimed to prevent too extensive asymmetry within the 
monetary union for a common monetary policy to be effective. Economists are afraid 
that real economies between the member states might still vary too much, even if the 
convergence criteria were fulfilled for instance in industrial sectors. The committee 
places the EU15 below the OCA-line in the graph of asymmetry with respect to 
adaptability, indicating that the EU15 might be too heterogeneous for joining the union 
in the third stage of the EMU. Instead of that, the core countries of Europe such as 
Germany, France and Netherlands already have a lot of trade with each other across 
the sectors. Hence, an economic structure of these countries is more integrated among 
themselves than with the countries in periphery. As a result, a smaller monetary union 
of the central countries would probably not be too heterogeneous to succeed at least in 
theory. (EMU-asiantuntijaryhmä, 1997, pp. 43–46.) 
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An opportunity of floating exchange rate is not much discussed in the report, but the 
economists of the committee do not necessarily find it as an absolutely positive 
counterpart to fixed exchange rate for its role as a monetary policy instrument. Freely 
floating exchange rate can be used against asymmetric shocks, but only if the entire 
economy is affected, not just one sector. Also, as mentioned earlier, floating exchange 
rate might be the root for instability, not a cure to it. The committee acknowledges that 
the fixed versus floating exchange rate regime is one of the major questions of 
economics and is very difficult to be answered. (EMU-asiantuntijaryhmä, 1997, pp. 
43–46.) 
Regarding Finland, monetary union can provide a lower, more unified real interest 
rate. Finland has periods of rapid inflation, devaluations and general instability in its 
financial history. This reflects to real interest rates, which have been higher in Finland 
than in Germany or Sweden for instance. As the interest rate is viewed to have a direct 
relationship with the stability of government debt and willingness to invest, a low rate 
would be beneficial. The committee believes that the interest rate within the union is 
generally lower than outside of it and the benefit appears essentially in the long run. 
(EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 49–51.) 
5.2.3 Finnish economy and asymmetric shocks 
According to the OCA-theory, a monetary union would be justifiable for the European 
center countries, but not for Finland, writes the committee. The committee proposes 
four historical reasons for asymmetry between Finland and the core of Europe.  The 
asymmetry takes place between business cycles of total GDP. The first reason is that 
Finnish production structure and foreign trade are rather unilateral compared to large 
EU-countries. This applies to other Nordic countries as well, but for example, Sweden 
has recently approached the core states with its production structure. Traditionally 
Finland relies on lumber industry and now increasingly on metal industry as well. A 
crucial feature for the reduction of asymmetry would be a bilateral trade inside various 
sectors with the other EU-states. Not just exporting lumber and paper but importing 
cars and computers for instance. Hence, Finland would be better connected to a 
supranational monetary policy of the union central bank. (EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 
1997, pp. 56–59.) 
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The second reason is extensive trade with the Soviet Union, which was not typical for 
the other EU-countries. The trade had an influence in Finland’s business cycles. The 
third reason is Finland’s historical inability to harmonize monetary policy, fiscal 
policy, and labor markets together. Inflation, devaluation, volatile competitiveness, 
and financial instability are consequences of this to some extent. In addition, the 
lumber industry has been trend-sensitive, so during the time the economy boomed 
intensively and vice versa. Also, important trading partners such as the UK and 
Sweden have occasionally practiced different monetary policies, and this has amplified 
the shocks in Finland. The fourth reason for asymmetry is the recent 1990s depression. 
Its basis lies in international markets, but various factors like the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the liberation of the financial market happened at about the same time and 
affected especially Finland. Particularly the first reason is suitable for the OCA-theory 
thematics. Long-term unilateral production structure might stir up asymmetry in a way 
that Finland falls behind the supranational monetary policy. (EMU-
asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 56–59.) 
The Bank of Finland has calculated the significance of different disturbances in the 
GDP of Finland. According to the model, exchange rates caused 28% of the historical 
GDP disturbances. The second was the trade with the Soviet Union by 18% and the 
third was interest rates by 11%. The rest 43% were deviations from the long-term trend 
that could be explained by other factors. The committee concludes that in addition to 
Finland’s own decisions, the monetary policy of important trade partners has also had 
an impact on the economy. Again, if the UK and Sweden were to join the monetary 
union along with other Western-European countries, the exchange rate based shocks 
in Finland will probably greatly decline. There would be only the US dollar and 
Japanese yen left to quake exchange rates. The committee adds, that in years of 1971–
1995, 44% of the GDP shocks have been caused by domestic factors. 36% of the 
shocks have originated from the non-central countries of Europe such as the frequently 
mentioned UK and Sweden. The results indicate that Finland is quite sensitive to trade 
with these union-hesitant countries. (EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 60–63.) 
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5.2.4 Monetary policy in the Eurozone 
According to the Maastricht treaty, the main objective of the ECB is to maintain price 
stability in the union. The treaty does not determine methods to achieve this objective 
so the ECB is given rather a free rein in that matter. Also, the ECB will be an 
independent organ from the political system and this stems from German central 
banking tradition. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Germans have been successful 
in maintaining low inflation. The Finnish parliament is used to have the last word on 
national monetary policy, based on a banking law from 1925 (Pekkarinen, 1994). This 
guarantees legitimacy, but also might bear a political conflict of interest and lack  time 
consistency. Regarding the ECB, independency comes with transparency and 
accountability of monetary policy. (EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 72–75.) 
The committee recognizes that as an outer country, Finland might suffer from common 
monetary policy of the ECB just like the theory suggests. Even if Finland did not join 
the upcoming monetary union, the monetary policy would probably still affect the 
external countries. The committee thinks that also national banks have an intention to 
determine their view of price stability and therefore follow the ECB monetary policy. 
The EU-countries that will not adopt the euro can join the new ERM2-system, which 
is a new benchmark currency that follows the euro. If the countries, at some point, 
desire to join the euro, they must adhere the ERM2 first. In other words, monetary 
policy of the ECB will likely prevail in Europe, regardless of whether acountry is a 
member state or not. The ERM2 is a consequence for Finland, if the monetary union 
and floating exchange rate regime will be rejected. Finland had a floating exchange 
rate during 1992–1996, and the experiences are rather positive. Even so, the period 
was too short for reliable criticism. Even with a floating exchange rate, the EU-
countries would still probably pursue tight monetary policy, because deviant policy 
would be interpreted as loose and harmful within the EU. No matter what currency 
system, the EU-countries have agreed to target a smooth and an efficient common 
market. Low-inflationary monetary policy is here to stay. (EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 
1997, pp. 72–90.) 
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The common monetary policy will probably succeed in dampening shocks, but the 
main responsibility remains in the participant countries. It will be problematic if the 
participant countries are too heterogenous and have different expectations for the 
monetary policy of the ECB. Not everyone can be satisfied, as there is only one policy 
in place. This concerns especially Finland that lies in the periphery of Europe, not only 
geographically but economically as well. Significant asymmetries among the member 
states build up a risky environment. Also, large fluctuations in the euro are challenging 
particularly if Finland joins the monetary union whereas the UK and Sweden would 
not. In particular this highlights the firm relationship between these countries. (EMU-
asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 90–91.) 
5.2.5 Fiscal policy 
Conditions for national fiscal policy in the monetary union are considered good. The 
common interest rate is determined by the ECB and fiscal policy of a small member 
state such as Finland, does not have any significant effect on the interest rate. 
Therefore, fiscal policy is a strong tool for stabilizing domestic business cycles, in  
case monetary policy does not exist. On the other hand, fiscal policy may have an 
externality in other countries, which can be negative. Expansive fiscal policy increases 
imports and stimulates the economies of other countries. If both countries are 
undergoing a downturn, then the total gain is positive, as the expansive fiscal policy 
of a single state revitalizes both. However, if the countries are in contradictory 
economic situations, the expansive fiscal policy just intensifies the boom in the other 
member state as a result and thus a harmful negative externality. The effect is worse 
with large countries, because borrowing starts to affect the interest rate, which can be 
adverse for member states in an upturn. Again, the issue is related to asymmetry 
between the participants in a monetary union. (EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 
93–94.) 
Monetary union brings new challenges for the coordination of the common monetary 
policy, national fiscal policies, and other financial segments in order to react for  
business cycles and for the maintenance fiscal sustainability. The presumption is that 
fiscal federalism will not increase along with the last stage of the EMU. The member 
states are responsible for their own fiscal policy. Regarding the convergence criteria, 
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the committee finds that the budget deficit requirement is too emphasized. Due to 
budget automation, deficits greatly differ among the EU-countries, especially in the 
ones that have a large public sector. In business cycles, budget automation plays a 
dampening role. Progressive taxation weakens a boom and transfer payments weaken 
a recession. The committee says that temporary budget deficits from automation are 
not harmful for sustainability. Even a country with a slight debt may face temporary 
budget deficits, that are seen unacceptable in the Maastricht treaty. A more appropriate 
way to measure fiscal sustainability would be for example to compare employment 
and budget deficit. Paying attention to the deficits is simpler but does not sufficiently 
pay attention to stabilization activities in fiscal policy monitoring. (EMU-
asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 108–109.) 
The committee recognizes the potential risk of accepting highly indebted countries 
into monetary union. High debts might threaten the entire union and its credibility. 
This has to be taken into account in 1998 and later with new participants. Greater is 
the debt, the more a new candidate country should provide information about its fiscal 
sustainability and ability to maintain it. Also, different properties of fiscal 
sustainability should be regarded, for example extensive pension obligations in future. 
Coordination of national fiscal policies will probably stay rather concise even though 
it would be desirable for stability of the monetary union. (EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 
1997, pp. 108–111.) 
5.2.6 About regions and taxation 
Along the monetary union, integration will stress national tax bases, and this concerns 
especially countries with high taxation such as Finland. Integration allows more 
effortless movement of taxable assets between the member states and that likely 
encourages tax evasion. Therefore, the national tax bases will probably get closer and 
in Finland’s case, there is pressure to lower taxation to correspond with other countries. 
Integration does not only affect taxation, but social security and services as well. This 
is a kind of continuation for declining income differences between European capitalist 
countries. On the other hand, labor mobility has increased little to none even though 
European countries have had significant unemployment differences since the 1980s. 
(EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 121–123.) 
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Settling down permanently in a foreign country has not been common in Europe and 
thereby it does not help with long-term unemployment issues. The domestic labor 
mobility is a significant stabilizing mechanism instead. Urbanization will increase, 
whether Finland joins the monetary union or not. This applies to the entire Europe as 
well. In case the monetary union will decrease Finland’s tax income, the rural and 
other areas with few residents will receive less resources from the government than 
earlier as a result. Subsidies that intend to maintain employment, services, and prevent 
recession will probably decline, but it is a part of urbanization as well. The committee 
is afraid that tax competition between the countries will push the general tax base very 
low. (EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 123–126.) 
Integration means changes in financial structures and thus capital movements among 
the member states will be more effortless to perform. The committee suggests that 
there has to be a coherent unionwide tax system, or alternatively all interest income 
ought to be taxed also domestically even if the income was from foreign countries. In 
addition, integration will probably stress corporate, labor, and value added taxes as 
well and some kind of harmonization should be done. Asymmetry between tax bases 
will likely lead to an adverse outcome if member states do not cooperate in the matter. 
(EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, pp. 128–130.) 
5.2.7 Labor markets and unemployment 
A new central feature, that especially Finland must adopt to, is the expected low 
inflation policy of the ECB. As mentioned earlier, both the upcoming Eurozone and 
consequently the countries exterior to it, will most likely meet with low inflation. 
Therefore, Finland has to adjust to new condition, whether it joins the union or not. 
Low inflation will restrict the amount that the average wages can rise in the economy 
or relative elasticities between different sectors and firms. Partly the adaptation process 
will automatically go forward, as tougher competition and free capital movements do 
not leave room for rise in wages. Also, national monetary policy is not available for 
revitalizing the weak competitiveness caused by relatively frequent and extensive rise 
in wages, which arguably reduces wage claims. (EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, 
pp. 138–139.) 
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A generally lower interest rate and free capital movements should fortify companies’ 
financial position, and this combined with smaller wage claims leads to the natural 
unemployment becoming lower. A concrete guideline to Finland is that nominal wage 
raises must be explicitly lower than they have used to be, because in a monetary union, 
the nominal raises shift almost directly into real income. It is assumed that in normal 
conditions productivity growth would be 2–3% per year. The ECB inflation goal will 
most likely be around 2%, which means that wage raises must remain in 4-5%. A safe 
rule of thumb could be that the wage raises equal productivity growth. In collective 
labor agreements wages have often risen more than agreed. The traditional high 
nominal pay raises from the past would lead to an increase in unemployment, but in a 
monetary union, these inflation spikes cannot be straightened with devaluations. 
Particularly the transition phase might cause problems and hence attention should be 
drawn to it. (EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 138–139.) 
There is a risk that in case wages rise justifiably in some sector, it will in consequence 
spread to other sectors that are not necessarily entitled for it. This may take place via 
supply chain and subcontracting or if the initial sector is regarded as a benchmark for 
wage bargaining in other sectors. In Finland this could be a case with cycle-sensitive 
export industry such as the lumber production and the rest of the economy. The issue 
emerges if general wage level rises together with major export industry during an 
upturn. Then, if the export industry falls into a downturn, the general wage level should 
decline as well but wages tend to shift only upwards, not downwards. Employees are 
not ready to give up acquired benefits. (EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 139–
140.) 
The committee brings forth a contrary issue: Some industry sector might be isolated 
from other sectors that are under tight international competition. Wages and expenses 
are allowed to increase more in the isolated and sheltered sector compared to the rest 
of the economy, mostly because higher expenses can be shifted into product prices. In 
the short run this does not affect employment. In the long run instead, expenses will 
rise in general and the sectors with higher competition will suffer from this, which 
eventually harms the isolated sector as well. To conclude, in the future wage 
bargaining should be centralized and held on an institutional level, so trade unions 
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have to consider comprehensive effects in the economy. (EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 
1997, pp. 139–140.) 
Another matter is probably to accept higher differences of wage raises between sectors. 
It is important that wage raises In successful sectors would not spread all over the 
economy in an inflationary way. The crucial issue is inelasticity of nominal wages. 
Without nominal wages, a monetary union and its policy would not have a large impact 
on macroeconomy. In short term, nominal wage inelasticity is the link between 
unemployment and monetary policy. It is unclear weather it would somehow change 
in the monetary union, but as mentioned earlier, people tend to be strongly against 
wage reductions, even if the real income would not change that much. If elasticity of 
nominal wages would not increase in the monetary union, other adaptation 
mechanisms must improve or be improved in turn. For example, active labor policy 
that includes retraining and employment agency could be a substitute for the 
inelasticity. (EMU-asiantuntijatyöryhmä, 1997, pp. 139–146.) 
5.3 2010s Finnish views  
Sweden and the United Kingdom never joined the EMU. The Calmfors report did not 
support the EMU-membership for Sweden due to the high unemployment rate and the 
weak state of the public economy (Kiema, 2017). Sweden was not ready for the euro 
back then and later in the 2003 referendum the proposal of the membership was 
rejected. The UK has been on the same line where the support for euro currency has 
always been low among the British. According to the Pekkarinen report, this was the 
worst scenario for Finland due to the reciprocal trade and imported shocks among it. 
Pikkarainen writes that external asymmetric shocks have not been the largest threat in 
the union however. The problems are rather caused by internal differences in economic 
policy decisions and by domestic features such as overheating of the real estate market. 
On the other hand, there are underlying elements for asymmetric shocks in Finland, 
for instance dried-up electronics sector, structural change in the lumber sector and 
international oversupply in steel industry. Also, Finland has yet maintained a close 
relationship with Russia in terms of trade, which may bring forth its own issues. 
(Pikkarainen, 2014.) 
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Kiema (2017) agrees with Pikkarainen that the Pekkarinen report focused on 
asymmetric shocks and did not consider global symmetric threats. The 2008 financial 
crisis shook up the entire banking system and symmetrically threatened the entire 
Europe along with the most Western countries. The reason why asymmetric shocks 
drew attention in the report was probably because on theory, symmetric shocks are 
easier to deal with, whereas asymmetric ones are systematic and derive from 
fundamental differences between member states’ economies. In Europe the financial 
crisis turned into a Euro crisis in which some Eurozone members, for example Greece, 
Spain, Italy, and Portugal faced huge public debts. Kiema says that the Euro crisis was 
somewhat predictable, but the ECB had no tools against it during the time. Inflation 
differences within the union led to differences in real interest rates, meaning that 
appropriate rate for Greece and Spain would be excessively high for Germany and 
Finland. This supports the theory according to which the member countries should be 
economically integrated for the best possible result. (Kiema, 2017.) 
Pikkarainen states that the Pekkarinen report did not bring forth anything about the 
banking union, probably due to lack of time15. Also, no one could have expected such 
extensive economic threats to the monetary union, as the Euro crisis was. Generally, 
banking union means methods that prevent potential crises which would in turn push 
countries into deep debts. In addition, the objective is to achieve joint responsibility, 
in which indebted countries can get financing from the union. Suggestions for fiscal 
or even political union are not unprecedented either. Pikkarainen adds that the official 
Finnish government report gives a more harmonized picture of the monetary union 
than the Pekkarinen report does. The latter brought forth concerns about too loose 
compliance with the convergence criteria, whereas the government report did not 
emphasize the importance of Sweden and the UK for Finland.  However, neither of 
the reports could see any critical crisis incoming. Hence, the challenges in the 
Eurozone are way more severe than was thought in 1997. On the other hand, the EMU-
committee had an accurate conception of the principles of the ECB monetary policy 
before the implementation. Considering how fast the Pekkarinen report was 
 
15 For example, De Grauwe (2018, pp. 142, 187–188) and Eichengreen (2014) view banking union as a 
requirement for a successful monetary union especially in the Eurozone, where most cross-border 
capital flows are carried out by banks and are strictly following economic cycles, see Allen et al. (2011). 
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concluded, it gives a rather satisfactory evaluation of the benefits and costs of the 
EMU. (Pikkarainen, 2014.) 
Kiander has assessed the first ten years of the EMU thoroughly. First of all, the 
convergence criteria actually did not have much weight. Countries such as Italy, 
Belgium, France and a bit later, highly indebted Greece, were accepted to the EMU, 
even if they exceeded the maximum debt criterion of the Maastricht treaty. Germany 
protested Italy’s membership because its debt was seen as a threat to stability in the 
monetary union, but with support from France, Italy was accepted as well. Politics had 
a larger role than the mutually agreed criteria. Another regulation that had to be broken 
was the no-bailout rule, that prohibited direct financing of member states. This took 
place during the 2010s Euro crisis. (Kiander, 2019.) 
Economically the first ten years were successful as the growth in the entire Eurozone 
was quite high and unemployment was in decline. Kiander says that the euro, the new 
currency, elevated mistrust in markets, making it cheap and thus imbuing the 
economies within the Eurozone, but still the more important factor for the growth was 
lower interest rates. Before the common currency, inflation and exchange rate risks 
caused a significantly higher interest rate in many countries compared to Germany. A 
decline in the interest rates divided the Eurozone into two groups; the countries with 
lower growth but higher deficit, and vice versa. These first mentioned net creditors 
were Germany, Austria, Benelux-countries, and Finland. (Kiander, 2019.) 
Finland was among the winners of the of the EMU in the first decade. Consequences 
of the 1990s depression tuned the economy into export-oriented, which can be viewed 
as the key to Finland’s success. Improved competitiveness, combined with the Nokia 
driven electronics cluster, led to great economic growth. GDP to debt ratio fell from 
60% to 40% in one decade. (Kiander, 2019.) 
The 2008 financial crisis and subsequently the Euro crisis caused significant damage 
to the Finnish economy. In 2009 GDP declined by 8.5% and exports by 30%. The 
extremely profitable Nokia turned out to be negative. Kiander writes along with the 
above-mentioned crises, Finland faced unexpected and huge asymmetric shocks, 
where Nokia and the lumber sector were probably the main victims. The economic 
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recovery has taken much longer compared to many other countries such as Sweden, 
Germany or Spain. Growth of the Finnish labor productivity basically just stopped. 
(Kiander, 2019.) 
National monetary policy is not available in the EMU, so Finland did what it could 
and used fiscal policy for increasing domestic demand in order to recover from the 
crises. Raising the general retirement age, tax reliefs and moderate-income policy were 
also part of the program for achieving high competitiveness that was lost during the 
economic crises. Kiander says that the 2010s Finnish economic policy may be 
considered successful even if the growth has been poor. Hence, domestic demand and 
employment were kept somewhat stable in an adverse situation. The low-interest rate 
of the ECB contributed to Finland’s fiscal policy, making the public debt inexpensive. 
(Kiander, 2019.) 
Vihriälä proposes that from Finland’s point of view, the economic costs of the EMU 
have been larger than the benefits. However it is not an argument for leaving the 
monetary union, he adds. Firstly, Finland could have acted to make the union more 
beneficial, and still can, by becoming more integrated part of the common currency. 
Secondly, a lot of economic issues in Finland are caused by something else than the 
membership of the EMU. Thirdly, the membership had also political reasoning behind 
it, which might have become more relevant than it initially was. The exit process has 
its own costs as well. (Vihriälä, 2017.) 
Vihriälä agrees with academics, that the EMU membership provides challenges in 
reacting towards large asymmetric shocks. The lack of exchange rate flexibility, in 
other words, own national monetary policy is a serious issue, but freezing wage level 
is a good substitute for it, he says. A decrease in nominal wages is not realistic 
anywhere, but even freezing provides positive effects. According to estimates, freezing 
the wage level could have offered almost the same benefit as flexible exchange rates. 
(Vihriälä, 2017.) 
The EMU-membership brings a stable and safe currency, lowers inflation and interest 
rates, and makes price comparison easier. More unclear is to determine the degree of 
these benefits. During the euro, Sweden’s foreign trade has increased more than 
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Finland’s, implying that the benefit of the common currency has not been great. 
Inflation has indeed declined, but Vihriälä says it is not due to the EMU-membership. 
The process with inflation and stable interest rates have been similar in Sweden that is 
not a member state. Even if the EMU might have complicated the recovery from the 
Euro crisis as the Finnish labor market is not sufficiently flexible,  the EMU cannot be 
blamed for everything. Along with the inability to adapt to decreased foreign demand, 
Finnish productivity had declined especially in the ICT sector. (Vihriälä, 2017.) 
Finland’s decision to join the EMU was primarily a matter of foreign and security 
politics. The Finnish EMU-report or its appendices did not raise a lot of discussion 
among professionals or the public, the committee chairman Pekkarinen writes. Also, 
the report was not crucial for the political decision of joining the EMU, but later it has 
been used as an example for advocating the membership, he adds. Just like in the 
EMU-report, Pekkarinen emphasizes the problem of asymmetric shocks, and how 
Finland was critically hit by them in the cases of Nokia cluster, lumber sector, 
machinery sector and in trade with Russia. (Pekkarinen, 2018.) Economists seem to 
agree on the domestic reasons for the early 2010s recession. Especially Nokia is often 
mentioned. 
On income policy, Pekkarinen writes that during the worst years of the Euro crisis, 
income flexibility was not sufficient. The role of wage flexibility was emphasized as 
a stabilizing tool against negative shocks. Generally, this means coordinated 
reductions in nominal wage levels. He says that in 1997 labor market organizations 
agreed to consider the EMU preconditions in their wage bargaining structure, but it 
was just all talk without any action. At the peak of the boom in 2007, before the global 
financial crisis, the labor market organizations settled on high agreement-wage raises, 
which reduced Finland’s competitiveness during the crisis. The wage agreement 
system could not sufficiently adapt to the problems of export sectors, and thus increase 
competitiveness against other countries. (Pekkarinen, 2018.) 
The ECB’s monetary policy was to keep the interest rate low to revitalize economies 
of the Eurozone. Probably Finland would have done exactly the same if it had the own 
currency, but the difference would have been in exchange rates. A healthy economy 
and budget surplus of Germany kept the euro rather strong compared to other 
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currencies. The markka instead, would likely have depreciated, due to its globally 
minor weight and weak condition of the Finnish economy back then. Both Pekkarinen 
(2018) and Vihriälä (2017) support the mentioned depreciation consequence of the 
markka. Pekkarinen reckons that this low-interest rate – cheap currency combination 
would have been better for the country’s competitiveness. Hence, own currency would 
have been more beneficial than the euro. On the other hand, there is a possibility that 
when depreciation is too strong, the investors might interpret it as a currency risk, 
which leads to an increased interest rate and consequently to a budget deficit. The 
question of the euro or not is multifaceted and hard to answer. During the first years 
of the 2010s, in an ideal situation, the own currency would have been a win-win choice, 
but no one can tell how the markka would have floated in real life, Pekkarinen 
concludes. (Pekkarinen, 2018.) 
68 
6 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter attempts to account for the optimum currency areas theory with empirical 
methods. The objective is to examine whether empirical data supports the theoretical 
framework in the case of the Eurozone. Especially Finland’s economic relation to the 
other member states of the monetary union is a subject of interest, as the results may 
approve or disapprove Finland’s membership in the monetary union. The data is 
historical, but the results are presumed to reflect the present in a way that the decision 
would be based on it.  
The subject of examination is to find symmetries and asymmetries of economic growth 
patterns between the certain EMU-member states and then investigate how the 
countries’ unemployment rate is affected by them. Potential symmetries support the 
economic reasoning of the monetary union and vice versa. The analysis does not 
attempt to answer which or what kind of countries should form a monetary union, nor 
does it try to fulfill any particular criteria of the OCA-theory literature, for example, 
McKinnon’s openness view or Kenen’s economic diversity view. This is mostly due 
to lack of time and such a large empirical analysis would probably exceed the purpose 
of a master’s thesis. 
According to Martin et al. (2016), the analytic approach to regional economic 
fluctuations began in the 1940s of the studies of Vining (1945, 1946a, 1946b) and Neff 
(1949). Neff’s main question in his analysis was the following, “Do industrial areas 
experience fluctuations in business which differ from those elsewhere in any 
significant respect?” (Neff, 1949, pp. 109). Fundamentally this is the objective of the 
empirical analysis carried out here, but in an international level and with a  comparison 
of aggregate outputs. In the regional economics literature, the focus has shifted to 
somewhat more sophisticated topics such as regional innovation systems and 
agglomeration processes, but for long the Keynesian theory was a basis for the 
business cycle research. Thus, out of trend economic fluctuations (shocks) are 
primarily caused by short-run changes in aggregate demand. The empirical analysis of 
this thesis follows the Keynesian view. Furthermore, the GDP trend shocks are shifts 
in exports that can be stimulated with national monetary policy which is not the case 
in the EMU. As mentioned in chapter four, the OCA-theory has provoked a lot of 
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empirical research, in which business cycle analysis has often played a major role. 
Namely, see Partridge and Rickman (2005), and Barrios et al. (2003) on regional 
business cycle asymmetries. 
The data used in this analysis is gathered from well-known and reliable sources. The 
euro period real GDP time series is from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) 
database maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The pre-euro real GDP 
data is from the World Bank database. The unemployment and employment statistics 
are from the Eurostat database. The German specific data is from the Federal Statistical 
Office of Germany (Destatis). Lastly, the Finnish specific data is from the official 
statistics of Finland (Tilastokeskus). All the results are statistically significant at the 
5% level unless otherwise specified. 
 
Figure 2. Normalized logarithmic real GDP in certain Euro countries between 1999Q1–2019Q3, 
1999Q1=100 (FRED, 2020). 
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The line graph in figure 2 visualizes normalized (1999Q1 = 100) seasonally adjusted 
logarithmic real GDP between 1999Q1–2019Q316 in 12 European countries. All of 
them are original Eurozone member states and have adopted the euro in 1999, except 
for Greece that joined two years later in 2001. Greece is regarded here because it is 
still one of the early euro-users and it has experienced a remarkable economic crisis 
during the common currency and thereby it is interesting to study. The following 
micronations; Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican are not considered here, because 
their significance is negligible due to their size. 
As shown in figure 2, the GDP in Ireland and small Luxembourg has increased 
substantially in comparison with other countries. Also, the decline of Greece is 
prominent in the graph. None of the countries could avoid the global financial crisis, 
yet no country fell below the index of 100 during the observation period. Even if there 
is a distinct cluster of a few countries, dispersion in economic growth among the 
member states is significant. For instance, in the period of approximately twenty years, 
the economy of Italy grew by 9%, as Ireland grew by 158% and Finland by 41%. Based 
on the positive growth values, it is impossible to say, what is the role of the common 
currency regarding economic growth. In theory, it should enhance the growth, as stated 
in chapter one. 
 
162019 quarter 3 data is not available from Greece, Ireland or Luxembourg. 
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Figure 3. Normalized logarithmic real GDP in Finland and EU11 between 1999Q1–2019Q2 
(FRED, 2020). 
In figure 3, Finland’s GDP growth is compared to the unweighted total value of the 
other eleven members’ of the Eurozone (called EU11 here). As it is evident from the 
graph, the progression is identical, while Finland is having different growth rates, 
generally higher than the group of the other Eurozone countries. Another observation 
is that Finland does not seem to have pronounced asymmetric shocks with respect to 
the EU11. The correlation coefficient of 0.96 supports this intuition.  
Probably, the strong ICT sector led by Nokia is one reason for Finland’s high 
performance in the early 2000s like the Finnish economists have thought. On the other 
hand, Finland suffered a bit more from the global financial crisis than the EU11 group. 
If Finland were to have a higher growth rate than the other member states, it could be 
unfavorable for the country in theory. The ECB would not touch the interest rate for 
the sake of Finland, and this intensifies the boom that likely leads to inflation. In 
recessions instead, the general interest rate may remain too high for revitalizing 
Finland’s economy, and in turn, recovery takes longer than it would with its own 
monetary policy (see Finland’s steeper fall around 2008 in figure 3). However, for 
example, Ireland has had low inflation during its high economic growth after 2014, 
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but the details are unknown to conclude it here. In fact, not a single country had an 
inflation rate of over 5% during the observation period (FRED, 2020). 
6.1 Shock analysis 
The concept of asymmetric shocks can be viewed as the core of the OCA-theory 
because according to it, countries in a monetary union are rather powerless against 
asymmetric shocks, in case wage flexibility and labor mobility are insufficient. As 
mentioned in this thesis, wage flexibility is often low at least downwards, and 
international labor mobility is not much better either. The Finnish EMU-Committee 
also acknowledged asymmetric shocks to be a challenge for Finland and the entire 
monetary union. Therefore, asymmetries between the countries are worth looking into. 
6.1.1 1999–2019 
Table 1. Statistical measures of normalized logarithmic real GDP trend deviations between 
1999Q1–2019Q2. 
 AT BE FIN FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES 
σ 0.19 0.15 0.41 0.13 0.15 0.99 0.95 0.22 0.35 0.19 0.30 0.41 
Max 0.56 0.40 1.08 0.32 0.24 1.78 1.73 0.50 1.04 0.50 0.52 0.82 
Min -0.35 -0.37 -0.83 -0.38 -0.42 -1.87 -2.04 -0.55 -0.91 -0.39 -0.61 -0.86 
β 0.033 0.035 0.029 0.023 0.024 -0.01 0.090 0.000 0.078 0.027 0.009 0.026 
𝑅2 0.95 0.97 0.75 0.95 0.94 0.11 0.84 0.00 0.96 0.92 0.32 0.71 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, FIN = Finland, FR = France, DE = Germany, GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, 
LU = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, PT = Portugal, ES = Spain, 
σ = standard deviation of residuals, Max = maximum residual value, Min = minimum residual value, β = slope of 
the trend line, 𝑅2 = coefficient of determination 
  
Table 1 shows the standard deviations of residuals between logarithmic real GDP data 
points and the trend line. Due to the residual mean equals zero, the values are 
comparable. Higher the standard deviation the more extensively GDP fluctuates 
around its trend within the time period. Accordingly, the standard deviation measures 
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the volume of economic shocks against the trend. However, it does not tell how 
intensive the shocks have been. Minimum and maximum values, and the illustrative 
residual graphs in appendix 1 as well, give comprehension about the shape of the 
shocks. β coefficients are slopes of the trend lines, depicting average quarterly growth 
rates. Values of 𝑅2 describe how well the trend lines explain the behavior of the 
countries’ realized GDP. 
 The trend line is formulated followingly: 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,    (1) 
where lnY is normalized logarithmic real GDP, α parameter is the intercept, β 
parameter indicates the slope of the trend line and ε is an error term at time t. 
With the given information, one can tell that the observed countries differ greatly from 
one another. Greece and Ireland have experienced stronger shocks out of trend than 
say Germany, France, or Belgium. The graphs of appendix 1 certainly confirm this. 
Also, the peak values of the former countries are multiple times larger than the latter. 
On the other hand, the 𝑅2 value of Greece is only 0.11, which means that the trend line 
is a poor model for describing the country’s GDP evolution over the years. Italy 
(𝑅2=0.00) is an extreme case, as the trend line cannot tell anything about its GDP 
growth, and that is recommended to bear in mind when looking at the other numbers 
of Italy. Additionally, β parameters of Greece and Italy are somewhat dubious. Greece 
faced a long economic crisis after years of relatively high growth and Italy had a low 
but unsteady growth instead, which might reason why the trend models are not 
appropriate for these countries. The varying β parameters imply the same as figure 2. 
Member states of the EMU have large differences in GDP growth rates, which can 
stress the economic cohesion of the monetary union. In the long run, the growth rate 
differences widen the gap in living standards. 
Ireland’s massive, sawtooth-like economic growth has large-scale deviations, but the 
trend line itself seems suitable, as the 𝑅2 value suggests. Overall, the appendix 1 
residual graphs look reasonable. Each of them captures the rise and fall of the 2008 
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global financial crisis at least to some extent. Besides Italy and perhaps Portugal, the 
trend lines are fairly descriptive in terms of the actual course of GDP, hence the 
examination of the deviations is sensible. 
Finland’s standard deviation is relatively high compared to the core countries of the 
Eurozone such as Germany, France, Belgium, Austria or the Netherlands. This might 
imply some kind of asymmetries between Finland and the others. Furthermore, the 
amplitude of Finland’s shocks is even double the size to the above-mentioned 
countries. Spain, on the other hand, has exactly the same standard deviation as Finland 
and in addition, their residual graphs are very similar. A deeper country-specific 
examination could bring insight to some similar or at least concurrent economic 
phenomena between Finland and Spain. Overall, the table values emphasize the image 
of Finland being geographically and economically in the periphery of the euro area, 
but one should not draw conclusions whether Finland would be better off without the 
monetary union. 
Table 2 is a correlation matrix of the GDP trend deviations. All the countries are 
compared between each other and lastly, the average value and the aggregate 
correlation (EU11 column) without the concerned country are calculated. The latter 
has the highest weight because the common monetary policy is determined by 
following a majority rule, thus deviations denote a weaker position in the euro. The 
average values are not mathematically weighted but still offer a quick look into 
commonalities. Here the correlation is a measure of simultaneous out of trend shocks 
between the countries. Negative values indicate asymmetry. 
The first conspicuous observation is Germany, that does not have a correlation over 
0.5 with any of the listed states, and clearly has the lowest relation to the aggregate 
GDP (EU11). Why doesn't the economic powerhouse of the Eurozone share the same 
shocks with the lesser members, which are assumed to be dependent on Germany 
regarding trade? For long, Germany has had one of the highest trade surpluses in the 
world, which may explain the weak correlation of the shocks in case the received 
money is not invested in the Eurozone (Destatis, 2020). Assuming that Germany has 
a lot of surplus trade with the United States, as in fact it does, in case the received 
dollars from trade are not invested further in other EMU-countries, but left on German 
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bank accounts,  the trade boom remains only in Germany and symmetric shocks will 
not occur. On the other hand, the Netherlands has a large trade surplus as well, but its 
shocks are well correlated with others. 
Ireland is along the same lines with Germany, as it is somewhat weakly correlated with 
others. A simple explanation could be that the country’s tremendous economic growth 
is in a different league and it does not seem to follow the aggregate trend nor is it 
effectively hit by global shocks. Despite the economic crisis in Greece, its shocks are 
still surprisingly well synchronized with the other member states, except for Germany 
that has the only negative correlation in the table. Again, the graphs in appendix 1 can 
confirm this. The Greek shocks occur about the same time and are corresponding with 
the other states, but certainly, the amplitudes are huge in comparison. 
By and large, the values of table 2 support the economic aspect of the Eurozone 
concerning the EU11. The lack of negative correlations indicates that there aren’t 
considerable asymmetric shocks that would provide serious economic harm to the 
countries. In other words, according to the positive values of the table, the ECB’s 
monetary policy affects the countries in the same manner, some more and some less, 
but it is a benefit for all (Germany-Greece relationship is an exception). Hence, none 
of the countries should meet the consequences of asymmetric shocks, such as 
unemployment or inflation from appropriate supranational monetary policy of the 
ECB. Some simple assumptions can be drawn here. Potentially the general economic 
trends might have such a strong influence resulting in asymmetries disappearing in the 
shown numbers. Also, it is noteworthy that not all the Eurozone members are analyzed 
here, even though the EU11 consists of the largest economies of the area in question. 
However, the aggregate correlation values are quite high and positive, which supports 
the absence of asymmetric shocks between the countries. It is worth emphasizing that 
both symmetric and asymmetric shocks here are GDP deviations from the trend lines. 
The countries might still have sectoral asymmetric shocks within their economies. For 
instance, a decline in the car industry in country A, while country B car industry is 
booming. 
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Finland’s correlation to the EU11 group of the other countries is high (0.87)  meaning 
that theoretically, the common monetary policy of the ECB is positive for Finland on 
every occasion. Therefore, the cost of the common currency in this matter is low, 
which supports the membership. Concerning individual countries, the economic 
shocks of Finland and Germany are weakly correlated (0.13), despite the fact that 
Germany is the largest trading partner of Finland (Tilastokeskus, 2019). One could 
expect the trade relations to link the shocks together in these countries. Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (2017) have concluded that Finland is one of the least correlated member 
states with the benchmark country Germany in their supply and demand shock 
analysis. Additionally, they find Belgium quite weakly correlated as well, but on the 
other hand, they count Spain to be one of the core countries of the Eurozone, while in 
this thesis Spain has the smallest correlation coefficient with Germany in the euro 
period.  
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Table 2. Correlation matrix of trend deviations of logarithmic real GDP between 1999Q1–2019Q2. 
 Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Average EU11 
Austria 1.00            0.75 0.89 
Belgium 0.93 1.00           0.73 0.86 
Finland 0.94 0.94 1.00          0.75 0.87 
France 0.92 0.92 0.93 1.00         0.77 0.91 
Germany 0.34 0.22 0.13 0.32 1.00        0.24 0.22 
Greece 0.74 0.79 0.87 0.76 -0.23 1.00       0.64 0.69 
Ireland 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.43 0.46 0.27 1.00      0.43 0.56 
Italy 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.94 0.27 0.82 0.53 1.00     0.79 0.95 
Luxembourg 0.74 0.79 0.73 0.82 0.49 0.60 0.65 0.81 1.00    0.71 0.88 
Netherlands 0.88 0.80 0.83 0.82 0.41 0.72 0.48 0.87 0.76 1.00   0.76 0.92 
Portugal 0.71 0.66 0.72 0.73 0.26 0.74 0.63 0.87 0.71 0.90 1.00  0.71 0.87 
Spain 0.83 0.84 0.91 0.85 0.01 0.95 0.46 0.93 0.73 0.85 0.86 1.00 0.75 0.82 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix of trend deviations of logarithmic real GDP between 1970–1998. 
 Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Average EU11 
Austria 1.00            0.57 0.86 
Belgium 0.88 1.00           0.61 0.93 
Finland 0.14 0.37 1.00          0.15 0.35 
France 0.79 0.87 0.57 1.00         0.53 0.89 
Germany 0.68 0.63 -0.20 0.54 1.00        0.43 0.58 
Greece 0.77 0.73 0.39 0.77 0.37 1.00       0.45 0.71 
Ireland 0.35 0.28 -0.18 0.00 0.09 0.36 1.00      0.18 0.09 
Italy 0.55 0.68 0.67 0.89 0.37 0.65 -0.25 1.00     0.36 0.64 
Luxembourg -0.02 0.03 -0.46 -0.27 0.43 -0.45 0.13 -0.46 1.00    0.00 -0.01 
Netherlands 0.60 0.58 -0.22 0.23 0.53 0.35 0.72 -0.07 0.55 1.00   0.41 0.41 
Portugal 0.76 0.85 0.32 0.79 0.72 0.57 0.21 0.59 0.20 0.49 1.00  0.57 0.87 
Spain 0.74 0.84 0.20 0.65 0.58 0.45 0.26 0.38 0.39 0.73 0.75 1.00 0.54 0.71 
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6.1.2 1970–1998 
Another point of interest is the difference between the period with the common 
currency compared with the time without the euro in terms of GDP shocks. Has the 
common currency integrated economies of the Eurozone? Next, the above-used 
methods are applied to non-seasonally-adjusted annual real GDP between 1970–1998 
(Worldbank, 2020). Quarterly data is not available. 
Table 4 shows the standard deviations of the normalized logarithmic real GDP 
residuals between 1970–1998. The mean of standard deviations is 0.35, whereas it is 
0.37 for the period of 1999Q1–2019Q2. Comparing mean values of standard 
deviations is not necessarily appropriate regarding foundations of statistics, 
nevertheless, the values are exceedingly alike, giving the impression that stabilization 
has not been huge. 
Table 4. Statistical measures of normalized logarithmic real GDP trend deviations between 1970–
1998. 
 AT BE FIN FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES 
σ 0.21 0.21 0.47 0.21 0.16 0.50 0.50 0.26 0.83 0.23 0.37 0.30 
Max 0.37 0.37 0.92 0.31 0.34 0.98 1.36 0.42 1.31 0.43 0.58 0.49 
Min -0.59 -0.55 -0.83 -0.56 -0.23 -1.41 -0.78 -0.48 -1.51 -0.37 -0.76 -0.65 
β 0.209 0.182 0.228 0.176 0.165 0.157 0.390 0.187 0.407 0.187 0.289 0.199 
𝑅2 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.99 0.88 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.97 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, FIN = Finland, FR = France, DE = Germany, GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, 
LU = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, PT = Portugal, ES = Spain, 
σ = standard deviation of residuals, Max = maximum residual value, Min = minimum residual value, β = slope of 
the trend line, 𝑅2 = coefficient of determination 
 
Extreme rates close to 1.0 do not occur in the first period as opposed to the euro era. 
The minimum and maximum values are a bit lower on average during 1970–1998 
compared to the latter period. Greece and Ireland are certainly more volatile within the 
Eurozone than without, unlike tiny Luxembourg, that has attained stability for its part. 
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Higher β coefficients in table 4 indicate a higher average annual growth rate during the 
corresponding time frame. Also, none of the coefficients seems to be offline from the 
sample.  
It is interesting how well the trend lines respond to actual GDP evolution, based on the 
𝑅2 values. This implies, that there are not any peculiar or unusually intensive economic 
shocks in years between 1970–1998. The 1973 oil crisis is not particularly prominent 
in appendix 2 residual graphs, unlike the bump of the 2008 financial crisis in appendix 
1. If the 1970–1998 GDP evolution seems to fluctuate tightly around its trend, thus is 
involatile, then why the shock standard deviations are about the same magnitude in 
both time frames? This could be perhaps due to the total GDP growth being higher 
between 1970–1998 than during the euro period, so the shocks are relatively smaller 
before the common currency, as the standard deviations are in absolute values.  
The overall assumption is that the observation period before the euro was economically 
slightly more stable than the period without it. Having said that, it definitely requires 
a deeper look into the topic to make up a proper conclusion, but if one has to answer 
yes or no, whether the euro has increased economic stability, then the answer is no. 
Without the unforeseen 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent Euro crisis, the 
outcome would have most likely been the opposite. It is worth noting that the analysis 
is naive and only addresses shocks in general, not asymmetric ones. Regarding 
Finland, its residuals’ standard deviation is slightly less after adopting the euro, but no 
significant changes can be noticed. As an interesting side note, from appendix 2 graph 
of Finland, the deep infamous 1990s depression, and the preceding so-called casino 
years can be clearly noted there.  
Speaking of asymmetric shocks, table 3 presents residual correlations between the 
already familiar 12 Eurozone countries in the years 1970–1998. Now Germany is not 
a distinct outlier, unlike Luxembourg or Ireland. Finland’s situation is not flattering 
either as the correlation coefficient to the EU11 group is only 0.35, which is among 
the lowest. In addition, Finland has negative ratios with some countries, indicating 
asymmetric shocks, which would theoretically hinder the effectivity of supranational 
monetary policy.  
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Instead of browsing dozens of individual correlation coefficients, figure 4 illustrates 
single countries’ correlation to the EU11-group in the two periods. In terms of 
integration, France, Portugal, Austria, Greece and perhaps Belgium seem to be less or 
more indifferent whether they have common currency or not. The first three nations 
also strongly adhere to the aggregate EU11 GDP progress, making them appropriate 
member states under the concept of asymmetric shocks. On the other hand, these 
mentioned countries’ mutual economic movements might vary a lot as they do. For 
example, Portugal - Belgium correlation coefficient is only 0.66, which is lower than 
the EU11 correlation of 0.87 between 1999Q1–2019Q2.  
 
Figure 4. Correlation with EU11 countries in the two periods. 
The figure suggests that Luxembourg, Finland, Netherlands, Italy, and also Spain are 
the winners of the original Eurozone (including Greece). Indeed, those countries’ out 
of trend shocks are more synchronized in the euro than they were with their own 
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national currencies, but it does not mean that all the countries are yet close to the ideal 
position of 1.0 correlation coefficient, like Ireland. However, the change is fairly 
positive as the negative correlations between the members are gone after the adaptation 
of the common currency. 
Instead of integrating, Germany has separated from the other group, meaning it is now 
facing asymmetric shocks more intensively than it did during the deutschemark. 
According to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Destatis, 2020), the German 
trade surplus has had an upward trend since the 1950s, which has intensified during 
the 2000s. This goes hand in hand with economic differentiation in terms of the GDP 
shocks. Whether there is any real relation remains unexplored in this analysis. 
As shown in figure 4, there are more winners than losers, indicating that the countries 
are shock-wise more integrated with the euro than they were without, and according 
to the theory, this is a positive outcome. Also, the mean correlation to the EU11 in the 
first period is 0.59 whereas it is 0.79 in the latter, which supports the proposition of 
the integration. How significant is the role of the common currency is again another 
question that requires deeper examination. Both Bayoumi and Eichengreen (2017) 
show mixed results about the economic integration. According to them, supply-based 
shocks are more coherent in the euro period than they were before it, but on part of 
demand-based shocks, the evidence does not support cohesion. 
6.2 Unemployment and shocks 
Unemployment is generally considered a negative economic and social phenomenon. 
High unemployment increases transfer payments, which strains the public economy 
and thus economic growth of a country as resources are not efficiently in use. In a 
monetary union, the only way to deal with temporary domestic unemployment issues 
is to practice expansive fiscal policy and hope that the unionwide monetary policy is 
favorable. Eventually, the expansive fiscal policy might lead to a budget deficit and 
indebtedness, whereat national monetary instruments such as devaluation or interest 
rate adjustment would have worked out better. Alternatively, even passive utilization 
of national currency could boost competitiveness and thus employment at least in small 
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countries. Minor currencies tend to be less valued than major ones (See Vihriälä, 2017 
and Pekkarinen, 2018 on Finland and Euro crisis). 
 
Figure 5. Seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in certain EMU-countries between 1999Q1–
2019Q4 (Eurostat, 2020). 
Figure 5 illustrates the seasonally adjusted quarterly unemployment rate in a few 
EMU-countries between 1991Q1–2019Q4. The differences are quite large. Southern 
member states Spain and Greece seem to have naturally higher unemployment rate 
than its northern counterparts Finland or the Netherlands. Germany has sailed 
somewhere between those, but currently has a very low 3.2% unemployment rate. The 
years after the Euro crisis have been remarkably adverse for Greece and Spain. In both 
countries over one-fourth of the labor force was unemployed at some point. For less 
than 25-year-old citizens the unemployment rate was over 50% during the worst years 
of 2012–2014 (Eurostat, 2020). How the ECB should practice its monetary policy to 
satisfy member states like Germany and Greece simultaneously, as according to the 
theory a low-interest rate would increase inflation in Germany while it would revitalize 
Greece? Again, this question is linked to the concern whether the Eurozone is too 
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heterogeneous while emphasizing clearly too insufficient labor mobility within the 
union for balancing out the unemployment issues. 
How country-specific unemployment levels react to the out of trend GDP shocks is 
calculated in this phase. It is quite safe and reasonable to assume, that economic booms 
and recessions have an influence on unemployment and not vice versa. Therefore, the 
causal connection is unquestionably given as it is assumed that shocks likely affect 
unemployment. According to Eurostat (2020), the unemployment rate is the number 
of unemployed persons as a percentage of the labor force. The employment rate is 
calculated by dividing the number of persons aged 20 to 64 in employment by the total 
population of the same group. 
Table 5. Unemployment and employment correlations between 1999Q1–2019Q3/Q4. 
 AT BE FIN FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES 
Correlation between seasonally adjusted unemployment rate and trend deviations 
t -0.23 -0.11 -0.80 -0.74 -0.22 -0.54 -0.80 -0.80 0.01 -0.62 -0.47 -0.54 
t+1 -0.28 -0.12 -0.82 -0.74 -0.22 -0.53 -0.79 -0.80 0.01 -0.64 -0.44 -0.48 
t+2 -0.28 -0.09 -0.80 -0.70 -0.21 -0.50 -0.77 -0.79 0.03 -0.64 -0.39 -0.42 
Correlation between seasonally adjusted employment rate and trend deviations* 
t 0.03 0.31 0.55 ** 0.04 0.70 0.89 0.72 -0.02 0.25 0.68 0.90 
t+1 0.08 0.31 0.55 ** 0.04 0.68 0.89 0.73 0.01 0.31 0.64 0.84 
t+2 0.10 0.30 0.55 ** 0.01 0.65 0.87 0.74 -0.06 0.32 0.57 0.78 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, FIN = Finland, FR = France, DE = Germany, GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, 
LU = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, PT = Portugal, ES = Spain, 
t+1 and t+2 = Number of lagged quarters, 
*Employment rate data not available from 2019Q4, 
**Data is not available 
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Table 5 shows the unemployment and employment rate correlations with respect to the 
GDP shocks between 1999Q1–2019. t indicates a non-lagged correlation. t+1 and t+2 
are one or two lagged quarters correlations. The lagged quarters are taken into account 
because according to the hysteresis hypothesis, unemployment changes might occur 
with a delay17. The first observation is that principally the unemployment rate is 
inversely proportional to positive GDP shocks, as it should be. This gives support to 
the validity of the shock analysis model used in this thesis. Correspondingly, the 
employment rate correlations are expectedly positive. According to neoclassical 
economics, labor demand is derived from an employer’s demand to increase 
production output, which depends on market demand for end-products. Hence, it is 
assumed here that GDP trend deviations are the ultimate factor affecting the 
unemployment rates, so the correlations present labor markets’ sensitivity to react to 
output shocks. 
The correlation values differ quite a lot. Based on the numbers, the Finnish, Irish and 
Italian labor markets react to shocks rather sensitively in the form of unemployment 
rate (0.80 coefficient). The unemployment rate of Luxembourg instead does not 
change almost at all, and the other countries are somewhere in between. High 
unemployment rate correlations might indicate that wage levels are rigid downwards, 
wage and other labor expenses take a large proportion of all costs, or collective layoffs 
are legally easier to execute than individual ones. Lagged values t+1 and t+2 are very 
similar to the unlagged values, which means that the shocks affect unemployment with 
little or no delay. 
Employment rate correlations vary as much as the unemployment correlations. The 
author’s own presumption was that the employment rates do not react to shocks as 
sensitively as the unemployment rates, as the former rate includes students and retired 
citizens who are not active in the labor market. The average unemployment rate 
correlation is -0.49 and the employment rate is 0.46, that are about the same size. In 
 
17 See Blanchard & Summers (1986). 
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addition, the correlation coefficients do not seem to have any significant relations or 
differences between themselves, for instance southern versus northern member states. 
The correlations represented the sensitivity of the labor market to the shocks. Now the 
interest is in the amplitude of how intensively the shocks affect the countries’ 
unemployment rates. A simple linear regression captures the relation between the 
shocks and changes in unemployment. The model is formulated followingly, 
 𝑈𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,     (2) 
where U is the unemployment rate in percentage, α parameter is the intercept, β 
parameter is coefficient, r is GDP trend deviation and ε is error term in an observation 
i. 
Table 6. Results of the regression analysis. 
 AT BE* FIN FR DE GR IE IT LU* NL PT ES 
α (%) 4.95 - 8.35 9.16 6.95 15.45 8.17 9.42 - 4.96 9.61 15.72 
β -0.79 - -1.87 -4.62 -3.48 -3.72 -3.44 -6.97 - -4.08 -5.34 -7.51 
𝑅2 0.05 - 0.61 0.54 0.05 0.30 0.63 0.64 - 0.39 0.23 0.29 
S (%) ±0.15 - ±0.77 ±0.60 ±0.52 ±3.67 ±3.27 ±1.53 - ±0.78 ±1.60 ±3.08 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, FIN = Finland, FR = France, DE = Germany, GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, 
LU = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, PT = Portugal, ES = Spain, 
α = constant term indicating a base percentage unemployment rate, β = Beta coefficient, 𝑅2 = coefficient of 
determination, S = Percentage change in the unemployment rate by a standard shock 
*Regression variable(s) is not statistically significant at p < 0.05. 
 
α parameter in table 6 denotes the base unemployment rate without any positive or 
negative shocks occurrence. One should not interpret it as a natural rate of 
unemployment, even though technically it is that during the period of time in question. 
The numbers seem to be somewhat reasonable in a way that the general unemployment 
rates in Spain and Greece are higher than in Finland or the Netherlands, as figure 5 
illustrates. Indeed, the α parameter of the Netherlands is only 4.96% as it is 15.45% 
87 
for Greece. The rates of the northern countries are a bit lower than the southern ones, 
but a precise distinction cannot be concluded. 
β parameter is the coefficient for the shocks and describes how vulnerable the 
unemployment rate is to them. The values between countries are comparable and thus 
the table reveals large differences. For example, the labor market in Spain reacts to 
GDP shocks almost ten times stronger than in Austria. Finland’s ratio of 1.87, implies 
that the Finnish labor market is more rigid than general in the analyzed EMU peer 
countries. On the other hand, the relatively low 𝑅2 values allude that the model is not 
accurate, but it does not genuinely matter, because some of the discoveries are yet 
supported by real-life observations. In addition, magnitude and comparison are more 
important concerns here than exact results. 
Lastly, the S variable illustrates how much the unemployment rate would change, if a 
country was hit by a standard shock, that is a theoretical concept made up here. 
Standard shock is the size of a standard deviation of residuals and tries to imitate a 
statistically typical shock in a respective country. In order to get standard shocks, the 
standard deviations of table 1 are multiplied by the β parameters of table 6. The 
standard deviation’s mathematical notation is always positive, but the assumption is 
that GDP shocks can be either positive or negative, so the values are reported in that 
way. 
It can be seen that high β coefficients do not necessarily mean high standard shocks in 
case the standard deviations meaning that the degree of trend shocks have been low 
during the observation period between 1999–2019. For instance France and Finland 
are an example of that. The β coefficient of France is a lot larger than Finland’s, but 
the French economy has been more stable, leading to smaller standard shocks.  
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7 SUMMARY 
This thesis has three different purposes. Regarding theory, the objective is to introduce 
the optimum currency areas theory and the costs and benefits of a monetary union. 
This section serves as a theoretical framework for the chapters to come. The thesis is 
also a review of Finland’s path to the EMU in the late 1990s. A comprehensive look 
into the official Finnish EMU-Committee report gives the reader insight into how the 
economists saw the pros and cons of the common currency. In addition, Finland and 
the EMU chapter includes the economists’ present viewpoints on the EMU-
membership. Lastly, a simple yet informative empirical analysis provides data about 
economic integration in the original Eurozone countries, and in Greece, concerning 
GDP trend deviations. How labor markets react to these shocks in the respective 
member states is also a subject of interest. 
The costs and benefits of a monetary union are generally acknowledged and mostly 
unquestioned. Upon adopting a common currency, a country relinquishes its national 
monetary policy to the union central bank. As compensation, the common currency 
eliminates transaction costs and increases price comparability within the union. Also, 
uncertainty related to the exchange rates disappears as there is only one currency in 
use. Without national monetary policy, the member states cannot adjust their domestic 
quantity of money, thus it has an impact on the interest rates or re/devalue the currency. 
These actions are considered as powerful instruments against up- and downturns of an 
economy. Loosening interest rate stimulates investing and recovery from recession. 
Tightening, on the other hand, restrains inflationary spending, which is also negative 
even if the economy would be booming. In case the member states of a monetary union 
are experiencing contrary economic periods, the supranational monetary policy of the 
central bank is inevitably detrimental to some countries. Optimum currency areas 
theory is a study of this issue and attempts to define what kind of countries should 
form a monetary union, in order to achieve all satisfying central bank. 
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to find out how well the original EMU-
countries and Greece are correlated in terms of GDP trend deviations. The analysis 
follows the concept of asymmetric shocks of the OCA-theory. The assumption is that 
economic shocks, thus temporary booms and recessions shift GDP from its long-term 
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trend line. The subject of interest is how well these shocks, meaning GDP trend 
deviations, are synchronized between the member states. In practice, this comparison 
is done by calculating correlation coefficients among the single countries. Country-
specific values might be interesting, but a country’s relation to the aggregate GDP, 
called EU11 here, is the most important because it describes how well a single member 
state can theoretically benefit from the supranational monetary policy of the ECB. This 
stems from the assumption, that the common monetary policy follows a rule of the 
majority. Also, the analysis includes a comparison of the aggregate GDP correlations 
between two periods that of 1970–1998 and 1999–2019, which shows if the economic 
integration has changed after adopting the common currency. Finally, the last part of 
the empirical analysis examines how sensitively labor markets react to the GDP shocks 
in the member states. 
7.1 Key findings 
While theoretical and practical costs and benefits of a monetary union are generally 
known, the optimum currency areas theory cannot still explicitly answer what kind of 
regions or countries should form a common currency area regarding real-world 
circumstances. Minimizing asymmetric shocks requires some kind of economic 
integration, but the scientific community cannot say which is the decisive factor. 
Mundell’s proposition of factor mobility works on paper, but seemingly not in real 
life. Wages are not flexible downwards, because no one is ready to give up the gained 
benefits or labor mobility is not sufficiently high due to social barriers. More or less 
the same applies to other theoretical propositions on economic integration. Some of 
them are even found incorrect, for example Corden’s (1972) and Fleming’s (1971) 
view on inflation. It is later pointed out that high-inflation countries can benefit from 
low-inflationary policy in a monetary union. In the very end, OCA-theory seems to be 
a theoretical academic discussion without strict rules but guidelines that could either 
work or not – in real life. 
In 1997 the Finnish EMU-Committee concluded a rather comprehensive and 
satisfactory report about the potential EMU-membership, considering the very short 
time frame during which it was done. Economists could not, in any case, see the 
upcoming global financial crisis and the subsequent Euro crisis. The committee was a 
90 
bit suspicious about how strictly the no bail-out rule or the convergence criteria are 
followed, and they were right. The criteria did not have much weight and the crises 
forced the ECB to bail out some of its member states for instance Greece. A look back 
suggests that own currency could have worked out better in the recovery of the 
economic crises of the past decade. For example, Jukka Pekkarinen (2018), the 
chairman of the EMU-Committee is a bit prone to this standpoint but emphasizes that 
in the end, it is impossible to say how things would have gone in the real-world. On 
the other hand, the committee quite accurately foresaw what kind of monetary policy 
the ECB would practice. 
Regarding the empirical analysis performed in this thesis, the results are surprisingly 
consistent and reasonable, meaning that interpretation can be highly reliable. 
According to the results, economic integration has increased among the original eleven 
EMU-countries and Greece during the euro period (1999–2019) compared to the pre-
euro period (1970–1998). In this analysis, the economic integration is determined by 
how well the countries’ GDP trend deviations thus shocks are correlated with each 
other. Germany is an interesting and prominent exception. It is weakly correlated with 
other countries in both periods and its economic integration has actually declined after 
adopting the euro. Finland is one of the ‘winners’ as it is now more integrated with 
others than it was in the markka period. 
Conversely, the volume of the shocks, has not significantly declined upon the common 
currency. There are differences between the countries but one cannot state that the 
general economic stability would have increased. Without the occurred crises the 
situation could probably be completely the opposite. In regard to the shock correlation 
analysis, the most important observation is that not a single member state is negatively 
correlated to the aggregate GDP trend deviations. However, it might be that mutual 
fundamental economic movements cover potential asymmetries in the results. 
The simple regression analysis implies that the country-specific labor markets react 
quite differently to the GDP trend shocks. An identical shock has a ten times stronger 
impact on the Spanish unemployment rate than the Austrian. Other member states are 
somewhere in between, though the results of Luxembourg and Belgium are not 
statistically significant. 
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Based on the numbers, the overall impression is somewhat mixed. The countries differ 
in economic growth, unemployment rates, and in labor markets. Additionally, 
amplitudes of the trend shocks vary quite a lot. In contrast, the economic integration 
process has been positive for most countries, even though the changes have not been 
similar in size. 
7.2 Further research 
In Europe, the interest rates have been generally low from the Euro crisis onwards. 
Currently, the ECB deposit rate is negative and has been like that already for a few 
years to revitalize economies. The key Main Refinancing Operations (MRO) rate is 
0.00%. The phenomenon is economically intriguing and most likely the old-timer 
monetarists could have never seen that coming, as they believed in the effectiveness 
of monetary policy. At the same time, the negative interest rate is a bit worrying, 
because it suggests that the ECB cannot stimulate the economy of the Eurozone in a 
desired way. It looks like the low interest rates are not going away any soon. An 
exaggerated question could be whether the (European) monetary policy has lost its 
effectiveness? The issue is tightly related to the subject of this thesis because the 
fundamental assumption is that national monetary policy functions as expected in 
theory and is the cost of a monetary union. Therefore, the unprecedented low interest 
rates are worth taking look at.  
The empirical methods used in this thesis are simple but still provide reasonable 
results. However, a more sophisticated approach could be carried out by separating 
GDP shocks into demand and supply disturbances by using the decomposition 
technique of Blanchard and Quah (1989). For example, Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001), 
and Bayomi and Eichengreen (2017) have used the decomposition method in their 
research in finding similarities in supply and demand shocks in Europe. Results might 
offer a more comprehensive understanding of the shocks. Concerning the observed 
data, a comparison between Nordic countries would be interesting and perhaps bring 
forth more study into optimum currency areas debate: Finland the euro country versus 
the other Nordic countries. 
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